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During the past month it has become much clearer
how Mr Blair at least hopes that the politically difficult question
of the European constitutional treaty will be resolved over the
coming months. In a widely-publicised interview with the Financial
Times last month, he argued that no referendum would need to be
held in the United Kingdom if instead of attempting to revive the
wide-ranging European constitutional treaty, the twenty seven countries
of the Union now simply agreed on a number of amendments to the
existing European treaties, incorporating only some of the less
contentious elements of the failed constitutional treaty. In Mr
Blair's view, such amendments could be regarded as purely technical
and administrative in character, involving little or no further
pooling of British sovereignty within the European Union. In these
circumstances, a purely parliamentary ratification process for the
United Kingdom would be sufficient.
All the more attention was given to Mr Blair's
interview because of the report which accompanied the interview
that this new British approach to the future of institutional reform
in the Union was shared by Mr Blair's likely successor, Mr Brown.
Mr Blair's present intention is to attend as one of his last acts
as Prime Minister the European Council in June, at which a timetable
and negotiating mandate will probably be agreed for a new Intergovernmental
Conference of the European Union. Mr Blair now seems to share the
hope of Mrs Merkel, who will be presiding over the European Council
in June, that this new Intergovernmental Conference will be able
to present to another European Council this year or next a proposed
series of treaty amendments deriving from the European constitutional
treaty. If, from the British point of view, all goes well at the
Intergovernmental Conference, it should be possible for Mr Brown
to accept these treaty amendments, argue that they are sufficiently
marginal and technical in character not to merit a referendum in
the United Kingdom and ratify them by using Labour's substantial
Parliamentary majority at Westminster.
The attractions of this tactic will certainly
have increased with the election as French President of Mr Sarkozy,
who is himself eager to avoid a referendum on a new European treaty.
His proposals for a limited "institutional treaty", which
would not need to be the subject of a further referendum in France,
have clear common ground with the approach sketched out by Mr Blair.
There have been persistent reports over the course of the German
Presidency of the Union this year that Mrs Merkel was working discreetly
to ensure a common view on the successor text to the European constitutional
treaty between Berlin, London and Paris (if Mr Sarkozy was elected),
a common view which would find its expression in the decisions of
the European Council in June.
There are, however, two possible barriers to such
a smooth and in many respects satisfactory resolution of the problems
arising from the impasse over the European constitutional treaty.
The first is that over the next six months the new Intergovernmental
Conference may find it impossible to agree on the amendments to
the existing treaties that it wishes to extract from the constitutional
treaty. Eighteen countries have already ratified the constitutional
treaty and will naturally wish to preserve as many as possible of
its provisions. Britain (and possibly others) will be at the other
end of this spectrum, eager to limit to the absolute minimum the
proposed amendments to the existing treaties, fearing in the British
case particularly that no domestic referendum could currently be
won on a wide-ranging set of European institutional innovations.
Mr Sarkozy's proposals for an "institutional treaty" sit
somewhere between these two extremes, but in their present form
are probably somewhat more substantial than Britain at least would
wish. Another set of controversies may be raised by the Polish government,
which is apparently still unreconciled to the new weighting of votes
in the Council to Poland's disadvantage, which was so prominent
a feature of the constitutional treaty, but is regarded by all Poland's
partners as an essential element of the Union's new institutional
balance.
The second unknown factor in this new emerging
European equation is the role of Mr Brown as Mr Blair's likely successor.
It may well be that he has acquiesced until now in the proposed
tactics of Mr Blair. But political and personal relations over the
past ten years between the two men have been notoriously volatile.
It is entirely conceivable that once Mr Brown becomes Prime Minister
he will strike an entirely different tone to that of his predecessor.
The recent local and regional election results suggest that the
current political position of the Labour party is an uncomfortably
weak one. Mr Brown may well find himself at the end of this year
or the beginning of next on the horns of a (largely self-created)
dilemma.
He does not wish to be isolated in the European
Union in the now increasingly plausible event that a consensus on
institutional questions can be achieved between Britain's twenty
six partners. On the other hand, he will be reluctant to sign any
agreement which makes him vulnerable to apparently persuasive calls
for a referendum in the United Kingdom to endorse the contents of
this agreement. Having accepted the (flimsy) case for a British
referendum on the original constitutional treaty, Mr Brown and New
Labour will be very sensitive to accusations that he is now trying
to implement its provisions "by the back door" without
a national referendum.
Mrs Merkel has been more successful than many
observers hoped (or feared) in reviving under the German Presidency
the European debate about a successor text to the European constitutional
treaty. In six months time, Mr Brown may find himself not thanking
her for doing so. It is overwhelmingly likely that David Cameron
and the Conservative opposition will call for a referendum on even
minor changes to the existing European treaties. A number of factors
will influence Mr Brown's willingness and ability to resist these
calls in late 2007 and the first half of 2008. Principal among them
is likely to be his perception of the impact of such a debate on
his and his party's electoral prospects in the next General Election,
which might well take place in 2009.
He may conclude that the Conservative party will
be damaged by shrill and obviously unreasonable calls from the major
opposition party for a referendum on a text which is being ratified
by parliaments in other member states. This would presumably encourage
him to sign the agreed amendments to the existing treaties and subject
them only to parliamentary ratification in the United Kingdom.
On the other hand, he may conclude that Mr Cameron
would be the beneficiary of a debate about whether there should
be a referendum on whatever new elements of sovereignty-sharing
(real or imagined) the adopted amendments contain. This would be
an uncomfortable risk for Mr Brown to be taking in six months time,
particularly against the likely background of unfavourable opinion
polls for the Labour government.
Had Madame Royal been elected French President
this month, Mr Brown would have been much less likely to face that
risk in late 2007. Her position would have been so much further
from the European centre of gravity, both in her proposals for amendments
to the Constitutional treaty and in her support for a referendum
on the final text, that agreement among the heads of government
would have been much less likely. Mr Brown might well end 2007 in
consequence regretting the defeat of a left-wing candidate for high
office in a major European state. This would certainly be a novel
and probably deeply unwelcome experience for him.
Brendan Donnelly is Director of the Federal
Trust and Chair of Federal Union. The opinions expressed are those
of the author and not necessarily those of Federal Union or the
Federal Trust. 29 May 2007
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