26 February 2009
Repaying student loans
20 February 2009
A news report from the BBC today reveals that growing numbers of students from other EU countries are not repaying their loans to the British Student Loans Company. (Read the report here.) What is going on?
The starting point is that, under EU free movement rules, it is not permitted to discriminate against students from other member states. If subsidised loans are available to home students, then they must be available to EU students too. It is a fundamental principle of federalism that nationality should not form the basis of discrimination.
However, it is also a fundamental principle of federalism that decisions should be centralised only if necessary and decentralised if possible, and here the problem arises.
The business model of the Student Loans Company is based on the notion that the loans it makes will be repaid by graduates through the tax system, and the amount repaid depends on the income of the borrower, rather than being repaid on a strictly commercial basis. If someone is not paying tax in the UK, they do not escape the obligation to repay but, as the BBC has reported, the SLC lacks the means to force them to do so. The tax systems in different member states do not talk to each other because taxation is held to be a matter for national sovereignty.
I gave a talk on this very subject in Ventotene last year – you can read it here – in which I suggested that the extension of the EU free movement provisions to university places should be unwound. The availability of free or subsidised university education is in many ways more akin to social welfare than it is to commercial activity, and, while discrimination against foreign people living in one’s own country is not allowed, there is no obligation on a member state to provide social welfare to foreign people in foreign countries. Overseas students who come to the UK in order to study at a British university ought to have their costs paid by their home country, not by the UK. That was the argument I floated, and it caused some controversy.
The current system may be uncomfortable, but the likely alternatives have drawbacks too.
The starting point is that, under EU free movement rules, it is not permitted to discriminate against students from other member states. If subsidised loans are available to home students, then they must be available to EU students too. It is a fundamental principle of federalism that nationality should not form the basis of discrimination.
However, it is also a fundamental principle of federalism that decisions should be centralised only if necessary and decentralised if possible, and here the problem arises.
The business model of the Student Loans Company is based on the notion that the loans it makes will be repaid by graduates through the tax system, and the amount repaid depends on the income of the borrower, rather than being repaid on a strictly commercial basis. If someone is not paying tax in the UK, they do not escape the obligation to repay but, as the BBC has reported, the SLC lacks the means to force them to do so. The tax systems in different member states do not talk to each other because taxation is held to be a matter for national sovereignty.
I gave a talk on this very subject in Ventotene last year – you can read it here – in which I suggested that the extension of the EU free movement provisions to university places should be unwound. The availability of free or subsidised university education is in many ways more akin to social welfare than it is to commercial activity, and, while discrimination against foreign people living in one’s own country is not allowed, there is no obligation on a member state to provide social welfare to foreign people in foreign countries. Overseas students who come to the UK in order to study at a British university ought to have their costs paid by their home country, not by the UK. That was the argument I floated, and it caused some controversy.
The current system may be uncomfortable, but the likely alternatives have drawbacks too.
¤ ¤ ¤
Another intriguing feature of the story is the job title ascribed to David Lammy, the minister responsible. He is described as “England's Higher Education Minister”. Well, he is not that. He is minister for higher education in the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, whose powers are largely restricted to England, the competence for higher education in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland having been devolved.
However, the parliament to which he is accountable is the UK parliament; the government of which he is part is the UK government. England, as such, does not have a government and does not have ministers. That itself is a story in its own right.
However, the parliament to which he is accountable is the UK parliament; the government of which he is part is the UK government. England, as such, does not have a government and does not have ministers. That itself is a story in its own right.
Posted by Richard Laming at 14:33
0 comments
What does the European Parliament do?
19 February 2009
Following on from the interesting remarks by Vaclav Klaus reported in this blog yesterday, it is interesting to look at the Civitas factsheet on the European Parliament. (Civitas is a eurosceptic thinktank that has published a series of factsheets on different aspects of the European Union, apparently having consulted people from different parts of the argument to make them as neutral and balanced as possible. I have my doubts about how neutral and balanced they actually are, as we shall see from my comments below.)
The factsheet starts like this (and you can read the whole document here):
“The European Parliament (EP) is the only directly elected EU institution and, as such, is seen as giving democratic legitimacy to the EU. However, it does not have the powers of a normal national parliament in that it cannot propose new legislation: it can only accept, reject or put forward amendments to laws proposed by the Commission. This has contributed to an image problem for the EP, with many European voters unsure of its role and exceptionally low turnouts in EU elections.”
The first sentence is broadly fine, if one overlooks the “is seen” remark and its implication that this is not in fact the case and, secondly, the complete neglect of the argument that the participation of member state governments and parliaments and their ratification of the EU treaties also has a bearing on the legitimacy of the EU. No, I want to take issue with the second sentence, that the distinguishing feature of a member state parliament is that it can propose legislation.
Going back to President Klaus yesterday, in his view, the crucial characteristic is that “part of the MPs support the government and part support the opposition.” The crucial point is that the parliament is ideologically divided, not that it can propose laws.
In Westminster, how many private members bills become law? And do the voters go to the polls because of the possibility that their MP might come top of the ballot and get to propose a bill? A private members bill only has a chance of becoming law if the government supports it or, at least, does not oppose it. It is the ideological character of the parliament that matters, not its right of initiative.
One of the attractions of the Lisbon treaty is that it would tend to increase the ideological character of the European Parliament. If the elections had the function of choosing, indirectly, the president of the European Commission, then the party political divide in the EP would get sharper and Vaclav Klaus, for one, would be happier. However, judging by other things they have written on their purportedly neutral website, Civitas would be less happy, so maybe it makes sense for them to focus on a different criticism of the European Parliament.
The factsheet starts like this (and you can read the whole document here):
“The European Parliament (EP) is the only directly elected EU institution and, as such, is seen as giving democratic legitimacy to the EU. However, it does not have the powers of a normal national parliament in that it cannot propose new legislation: it can only accept, reject or put forward amendments to laws proposed by the Commission. This has contributed to an image problem for the EP, with many European voters unsure of its role and exceptionally low turnouts in EU elections.”
The first sentence is broadly fine, if one overlooks the “is seen” remark and its implication that this is not in fact the case and, secondly, the complete neglect of the argument that the participation of member state governments and parliaments and their ratification of the EU treaties also has a bearing on the legitimacy of the EU. No, I want to take issue with the second sentence, that the distinguishing feature of a member state parliament is that it can propose legislation.
Going back to President Klaus yesterday, in his view, the crucial characteristic is that “part of the MPs support the government and part support the opposition.” The crucial point is that the parliament is ideologically divided, not that it can propose laws.
In Westminster, how many private members bills become law? And do the voters go to the polls because of the possibility that their MP might come top of the ballot and get to propose a bill? A private members bill only has a chance of becoming law if the government supports it or, at least, does not oppose it. It is the ideological character of the parliament that matters, not its right of initiative.
One of the attractions of the Lisbon treaty is that it would tend to increase the ideological character of the European Parliament. If the elections had the function of choosing, indirectly, the president of the European Commission, then the party political divide in the EP would get sharper and Vaclav Klaus, for one, would be happier. However, judging by other things they have written on their purportedly neutral website, Civitas would be less happy, so maybe it makes sense for them to focus on a different criticism of the European Parliament.
Posted by Richard Laming at 17:30
2 comments
Europe needs an opposition
17 February 2009
Czech president Václav Klaus touched a few raw nerves with his speech in the European Parliament today, but he also unveiled the contradictions in his position. (You can read the speech here.)
President Klaus is a noted critic of the European Union and did not skimp on his criticism today – apparently some MEPs walked out in protest – declaring the European Parliament to be distant from the voters and the EU as a whole to be too centralised.
But, as ever, it is important to distinguish between these two issues – the powers of the EU and its decision-making methods – and look at them separately.
On the powers, President Klaus said that the EU has two tasks: “removing unnecessary – and for human freedom and prosperity counterproductive – barriers” and “a joint care of the public goods”, issues which he said should be chosen “rationally”. He was clear that “there was and there is no alternative to the European Union membership”: maybe the EU has too many powers, but it should certainly have some.
In which case, how should it exercise those powers? President Klaus does not think that the European Parliament can serve as a genuine representative of the citizens, because “there is no European demos”. How the EU should take its decisions he does not say, only that it should not do it the present way. The Lisbon treaty, he says, would make matters worse, not better. A parliamentary democracy needs a government and an opposition, which the European Parliament lacks.
It is no good to object to the bureaucratisation of the European Union, as President Klaus does, and then blame the European Parliament. Without the EP, there would even more bureaucracy, not less. Federalists agree with the call for a government and opposition model for the European Parliament, but President Klaus would be surprised to find himself in their company. But he cannot resort to the Daniel Hannan argument that the EU should not exist at all: remember that “there was and there is no alternative to the European Union membership”.
President Klaus is a noted critic of the European Union and did not skimp on his criticism today – apparently some MEPs walked out in protest – declaring the European Parliament to be distant from the voters and the EU as a whole to be too centralised.
But, as ever, it is important to distinguish between these two issues – the powers of the EU and its decision-making methods – and look at them separately.
On the powers, President Klaus said that the EU has two tasks: “removing unnecessary – and for human freedom and prosperity counterproductive – barriers” and “a joint care of the public goods”, issues which he said should be chosen “rationally”. He was clear that “there was and there is no alternative to the European Union membership”: maybe the EU has too many powers, but it should certainly have some.
In which case, how should it exercise those powers? President Klaus does not think that the European Parliament can serve as a genuine representative of the citizens, because “there is no European demos”. How the EU should take its decisions he does not say, only that it should not do it the present way. The Lisbon treaty, he says, would make matters worse, not better. A parliamentary democracy needs a government and an opposition, which the European Parliament lacks.
It is no good to object to the bureaucratisation of the European Union, as President Klaus does, and then blame the European Parliament. Without the EP, there would even more bureaucracy, not less. Federalists agree with the call for a government and opposition model for the European Parliament, but President Klaus would be surprised to find himself in their company. But he cannot resort to the Daniel Hannan argument that the EU should not exist at all: remember that “there was and there is no alternative to the European Union membership”.
Posted by Richard Laming at 20:19
2 comments
Our independent deterrent
16 February 2009
Thinking more about the submarine collision that was reported yesterday, there was an interesting conversation on the radio this morning with a veteran commander of nuclear submarines. He was being asked about how it could happen that two submarines might end up in the same place, in view of that fact that there are many thousands of square miles of Atlantic in which they sail.
It’s worse than that, was the reply. They are cubic miles, not square miles, and yet still two submarines collided.
The reason that submarines go where they do is that they are trying to hide. This means avoiding detection by the enemy but also remaining able to detect any possible enemy surveillance. The captain of the submarine has to take a judgement as to the balance between these two objectives, and, what happens? Both British and French captains make the same judgement, and their ships collide with each other.
Some parts of the ocean are better than others as places to hide, but those best places to hide turn out to be crowded.
Two thoughts arise from this. First, are deep ocean submarines really quite as undetectable as was previously thought? A nuclear second strike capability depends on their ability to disappear, rather than being bumped into as though on a crowded pavement at Oxford Circus.
Secondly, there is the fact that this was a collision between the submarines of Britain and France. Each is supposed to be acting independently to provide a deterrent capability: now we know that they are actually doing the same job, sailing in the very same waters, and are not acting independently at all. In which case, we surely don’t need two separate submarine programmes and would save a lot of money if we had only the one.
It’s worse than that, was the reply. They are cubic miles, not square miles, and yet still two submarines collided.
The reason that submarines go where they do is that they are trying to hide. This means avoiding detection by the enemy but also remaining able to detect any possible enemy surveillance. The captain of the submarine has to take a judgement as to the balance between these two objectives, and, what happens? Both British and French captains make the same judgement, and their ships collide with each other.
Some parts of the ocean are better than others as places to hide, but those best places to hide turn out to be crowded.
Two thoughts arise from this. First, are deep ocean submarines really quite as undetectable as was previously thought? A nuclear second strike capability depends on their ability to disappear, rather than being bumped into as though on a crowded pavement at Oxford Circus.
Secondly, there is the fact that this was a collision between the submarines of Britain and France. Each is supposed to be acting independently to provide a deterrent capability: now we know that they are actually doing the same job, sailing in the very same waters, and are not acting independently at all. In which case, we surely don’t need two separate submarine programmes and would save a lot of money if we had only the one.
Posted by Richard Laming at 10:44
0 comments
Avoiding collisions
12 February 2009
Amid the news reports today about the collision between British and French nuclear submarines in the Arctic recently, my mind goes to a recent story about two satellites that collided in space. You can read the story here.
While the submarine crash can be blamed on human error, no such excuse attaches to the satellites. There are no rules at present to govern the way in which different countries and companies launch satellites into orbit, and as the use of space is increasingly important for the technologies upon which we rely, space is going to get more and more crowded.
If there is no means of keeping order, there will be more crashes.
While the submarine crash can be blamed on human error, no such excuse attaches to the satellites. There are no rules at present to govern the way in which different countries and companies launch satellites into orbit, and as the use of space is increasingly important for the technologies upon which we rely, space is going to get more and more crowded.
If there is no means of keeping order, there will be more crashes.
Posted by Richard Laming at 15:06
0 comments
Reasons for the Socialists not to nominate a candidate for president
11 February 2009
I’ve written a few articles lately on why the Socialists should nominate a candidate for president of the Commission in the run-up to the European elections this summer – here, for example – and have been asked why they might not do so. The case looks compelling, doesn’t it?
So here are six reasons why they might not choose a candidate.
1. Heads of government lose influence
The procedure laid down in the treaties is that the European Council (i.e. the heads of government) proposes a candidate and the European Parliament then approves that proposal. The EP has never yet rejected a proposal: the idea that candidates for president should be nominated as part of the election process implies that the EP would be ready to reject any proposal other than the one made at the time of the election.
Think about this from the point of view of a Socialist head of a national government. Under the current system s/he gets a say in who the Commission president will be (regardless of party) when the European Council makes its decision about whom to propose; under the new system, s/he would have a say, as leader of a PES member party, in the identity of the Socialist candidate, but would have no say in the choice of the Christian Democrat candidate for president. If the European election produces a centre-right victory, the opinions of that Socialist prime minister are effectively disregarded. Voters get more say: prime ministers get a bit less.
It is worth pointing out that the power of any individual prime minister over the appointment is less than it was. Since the Nice treaty came into force, the decision by the European Council is taken by qualified majority rather than by unanimity. This means that it is no longer open to a single prime minister to veto a candidate, as John Major did to Jean-Luc Dehaene in 1994.
2. The Commission president will be stronger as a result
At present, as mentioned above, the Commission president depends primarily for his/her nomination on the approval of the European Council. That means that the balance of power in the institutional system leans ever so slightly towards the member states. To move the principal decision about the next president of the Commission away from the European Council towards the European Parliament gives the Commission president a little more strength compared with the national governments. Conversely, it would make him/her a little more dependent on the European Parliament. Given that the major rivalry in the EU’s institutional system is between the Commission and the member states rather than between the Commission and the Parliament, this would, overall, tend to strengthen the Commission a little.
3. They might lose the election and be in a weaker position than if they didn't fight it
It would wrong to overstate party political divisions within the European institutions. There is bound to be a coalition of some sort after the elections, given the systems of proportional representation in use and the wide range of political opinions among the European voters. In that light, even if there is a Christian Democrat president of the Commission nominated by the European Council, Socialists will still have a strong influence within the Commission as a whole. That would be part of the deal.
If, however, the Socialists rejected the idea of such a deal and chose to challenge it in the ballot box in June, they might find themselves with less influence in a subsequent EPP-led Commission if that’s what the ballot box finally produced. Given that the Socialists clearly start in second place (with only 217 MEPs compared to the EPP’s 288), challenging the status quo risks reducing their influence rather than enhancing it.
4. They can’t find a credible candidate willing to take the risk of losing
A realistic candidate for president of the Commission will have a substantial track record in government, as a prime minister or senior cabinet minister at national level, or within the Commission itself. To run for Commission president and not succeed would put a mark of failure on one’s CV. It is easy to imagine that potential candidates might be deterred by this, particularly given that a Socialist candidate will be starting from second place.
5. They can’t agree on a candidate
Rather than having too few candidates, there is the opposite problem of having too many. The opportunity to become the first popularly (if indirectly) elected president of the Commission might be very attractive, as might the simple fact of having created the contest (even if the Socialist candidate loses, s/he deserves to be remembered as the person who made such a contest possible). There is at present no obvious Socialist candidate, nor is there a procedure for choosing one. However, it should not be impossible to choose a candidate, nor is it too late to do so. The US presidential candidates were chosen at conventions held at the end of August or the beginning of September, nine or ten weeks before the election. We are still 16 weeks away from the EP elections in June.
6. The procedure is not in the current treaties
The Lisbon treaty puts the requirement that the European Council will make its nomination of Commission president taking into account the elections to the European Parliament in writing. The current treaties are silent on the subject. Some people argue that anything in the Lisbon treaty should therefore wait upon its ratification and entry into force before being implemented.
But this misunderstands the treaty. The significance of the Lisbon treaty is that it compels the European Council to take into account the elections to the European Parliament: the absence of such compulsion does not prevent it from doing so.
So here are six reasons why they might not choose a candidate.
1. Heads of government lose influence
The procedure laid down in the treaties is that the European Council (i.e. the heads of government) proposes a candidate and the European Parliament then approves that proposal. The EP has never yet rejected a proposal: the idea that candidates for president should be nominated as part of the election process implies that the EP would be ready to reject any proposal other than the one made at the time of the election.
Think about this from the point of view of a Socialist head of a national government. Under the current system s/he gets a say in who the Commission president will be (regardless of party) when the European Council makes its decision about whom to propose; under the new system, s/he would have a say, as leader of a PES member party, in the identity of the Socialist candidate, but would have no say in the choice of the Christian Democrat candidate for president. If the European election produces a centre-right victory, the opinions of that Socialist prime minister are effectively disregarded. Voters get more say: prime ministers get a bit less.
It is worth pointing out that the power of any individual prime minister over the appointment is less than it was. Since the Nice treaty came into force, the decision by the European Council is taken by qualified majority rather than by unanimity. This means that it is no longer open to a single prime minister to veto a candidate, as John Major did to Jean-Luc Dehaene in 1994.
2. The Commission president will be stronger as a result
At present, as mentioned above, the Commission president depends primarily for his/her nomination on the approval of the European Council. That means that the balance of power in the institutional system leans ever so slightly towards the member states. To move the principal decision about the next president of the Commission away from the European Council towards the European Parliament gives the Commission president a little more strength compared with the national governments. Conversely, it would make him/her a little more dependent on the European Parliament. Given that the major rivalry in the EU’s institutional system is between the Commission and the member states rather than between the Commission and the Parliament, this would, overall, tend to strengthen the Commission a little.
3. They might lose the election and be in a weaker position than if they didn't fight it
It would wrong to overstate party political divisions within the European institutions. There is bound to be a coalition of some sort after the elections, given the systems of proportional representation in use and the wide range of political opinions among the European voters. In that light, even if there is a Christian Democrat president of the Commission nominated by the European Council, Socialists will still have a strong influence within the Commission as a whole. That would be part of the deal.
If, however, the Socialists rejected the idea of such a deal and chose to challenge it in the ballot box in June, they might find themselves with less influence in a subsequent EPP-led Commission if that’s what the ballot box finally produced. Given that the Socialists clearly start in second place (with only 217 MEPs compared to the EPP’s 288), challenging the status quo risks reducing their influence rather than enhancing it.
4. They can’t find a credible candidate willing to take the risk of losing
A realistic candidate for president of the Commission will have a substantial track record in government, as a prime minister or senior cabinet minister at national level, or within the Commission itself. To run for Commission president and not succeed would put a mark of failure on one’s CV. It is easy to imagine that potential candidates might be deterred by this, particularly given that a Socialist candidate will be starting from second place.
5. They can’t agree on a candidate
Rather than having too few candidates, there is the opposite problem of having too many. The opportunity to become the first popularly (if indirectly) elected president of the Commission might be very attractive, as might the simple fact of having created the contest (even if the Socialist candidate loses, s/he deserves to be remembered as the person who made such a contest possible). There is at present no obvious Socialist candidate, nor is there a procedure for choosing one. However, it should not be impossible to choose a candidate, nor is it too late to do so. The US presidential candidates were chosen at conventions held at the end of August or the beginning of September, nine or ten weeks before the election. We are still 16 weeks away from the EP elections in June.
6. The procedure is not in the current treaties
The Lisbon treaty puts the requirement that the European Council will make its nomination of Commission president taking into account the elections to the European Parliament in writing. The current treaties are silent on the subject. Some people argue that anything in the Lisbon treaty should therefore wait upon its ratification and entry into force before being implemented.
But this misunderstands the treaty. The significance of the Lisbon treaty is that it compels the European Council to take into account the elections to the European Parliament: the absence of such compulsion does not prevent it from doing so.
Posted by Richard Laming at 11:59
4 comments
Can Geert Wilders enter Britain?
Controversial Dutch politician Geert Wilders has been banned from coming to the UK. (Read the story here.) He has made a film critical of Islam, which he proposes to show at a meeting in the House of Lords, but the Home Secretary has denied him entry to this country. His views on Islam and the Koran are somewhat provocative and the government thinks that his presence would not be conducive to the public good.
I don’t know enough about Geert Wilders to be able to judge whether he should have been banned (although his film is apparently available on the internet for all the complaints about the denial of free speech – anyone can see it who wants to) but it is interesting to note that he can be banned. For all the complaints from the anti-Europeans that membership of the EU has hollowed out our political system and abolished our borders, clearly things are not quite so far gone as they claim.
I don’t know enough about Geert Wilders to be able to judge whether he should have been banned (although his film is apparently available on the internet for all the complaints about the denial of free speech – anyone can see it who wants to) but it is interesting to note that he can be banned. For all the complaints from the anti-Europeans that membership of the EU has hollowed out our political system and abolished our borders, clearly things are not quite so far gone as they claim.
Posted by Richard Laming at 17:15
2 comments
The special relationship
10 February 2009
An interesting debate in Westminster Hall yesterday on the United States of America included an interesting exchange of views between two Conservative MPs, Mark Pritchard (who introduced the debate) and Mark Field. (Read the debate here.)
Mark Pritchard, who is a fairly mainstream Eurosceptic, extolled the virtues of the USA (not wrongly) but struggled to square that with his opposition to the EU:
“In the American State Department, the Pentagon and elsewhere in Washington DC, including in the previous and current White House Administrations, is a shared view that a united Europe is good news for America’s national security, for its treaty obligations under NATO and for reducing the likelihood of future conflicts in Europe. I understand that view, but it is fundamentally flawed.”
Not only previous administration has supported European integration, but in fact all the way to the launch of the Marshall Plan in 1947. (In fact, there was a rather confused period under George W Bush (which you can read about here).) It is unusual, even for a Eurosceptic, to praise the geopolitical vision of George W Bush over that of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Reagan or Clinton.
Why did he take this view? He explained:
“I understand that a stable Europe is good news for America and Britain, but it is individual nation states, within Europe, that have stood with America in times of need. Never—not even in world war two—has there been a fully united European voice; there have only ever been the voices of nation states, some coming together.”
But this is a circular argument. Those times of need have arisen precisely because of the lack of a common European position. Historians are fairly well agreed that it was the possibility of different policies on the part of Britain and France that was a major factor in German strategies that led to war both in 1914 and 1938/9. Since then, the determination to find common policies in the face of common threats in defence of common interests has played a major part in keeping the peace of Europe and, thus, the peace of America.
In the Federal Union archives, you can find a pamphlet written by Keith Killby in 1942, “Peace – what then?” (which you can read here), in which he put it like this:
“Every country, now in the war, wished to avoid the German menace and tried to avoid war. Each changed its attitude from one of conciliation to one of a brave show of force many times, but very seldom did these brave shows of force coincide. Consequently Hitler was able to attack and overcome them one at a time. There can be little doubt but that if all the nations now occupied by Germany had withstood and attacked at the same time Germany would have been overrun as quickly as she overran the Low Countries. Or very likely if they had unequivocally stated their unity at the outset on this vital matter of solid common defence the Nazi attack would never have come. But this unity was not to be. Each nation first of all thought of itself and acted accordingly. On such a basis united and therefore effective and decisive action could never result. Even Britain and France were until the eleventh hour divided on a policy concerning the Nazi menace. That delay had its tragic influence upon the course of the war as we all know.”
Mark Field, by contrast, made a more interesting comment on the future of the relationship with America:
“Much as we have a good relationship with America, which is based on common language, and common history, it would be wrong to overstate the nature of that relationship. If we look at the large Hispanic population in America, and then spool forward a decade or so, I suspect that we will find few people talking about the special relationship between our two countries. Instead, American foreign policy will focus on its relationship with Europe.
“Although I instinctively agree with much of what my hon. Friend had to say about the importance of nation states, I also fear that the tremendous economic turmoil facing this country, and the world, will be with us for some years to come. We will hear increasing voices in this country—from across the political spectrum—calling for us to integrate with the power block in Europe. Remember, we eventually joined the EC in 1973 as a defence mechanism. We felt that the only way forward for this country was to latch ourselves on to Europe. That debate on our integration within an all-powerful European block will go on in the decades ahead. In the future, the world will be in blocks.”
In that light, the major question in the international sphere is how to arrange the relations between those blocks. A friendly relationship with America will be essential, but it will be managed best if Britain is part of Europe rather than attempting to go it alone.
Mark Pritchard, who is a fairly mainstream Eurosceptic, extolled the virtues of the USA (not wrongly) but struggled to square that with his opposition to the EU:
“In the American State Department, the Pentagon and elsewhere in Washington DC, including in the previous and current White House Administrations, is a shared view that a united Europe is good news for America’s national security, for its treaty obligations under NATO and for reducing the likelihood of future conflicts in Europe. I understand that view, but it is fundamentally flawed.”
Not only previous administration has supported European integration, but in fact all the way to the launch of the Marshall Plan in 1947. (In fact, there was a rather confused period under George W Bush (which you can read about here).) It is unusual, even for a Eurosceptic, to praise the geopolitical vision of George W Bush over that of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Reagan or Clinton.
Why did he take this view? He explained:
“I understand that a stable Europe is good news for America and Britain, but it is individual nation states, within Europe, that have stood with America in times of need. Never—not even in world war two—has there been a fully united European voice; there have only ever been the voices of nation states, some coming together.”
But this is a circular argument. Those times of need have arisen precisely because of the lack of a common European position. Historians are fairly well agreed that it was the possibility of different policies on the part of Britain and France that was a major factor in German strategies that led to war both in 1914 and 1938/9. Since then, the determination to find common policies in the face of common threats in defence of common interests has played a major part in keeping the peace of Europe and, thus, the peace of America.
In the Federal Union archives, you can find a pamphlet written by Keith Killby in 1942, “Peace – what then?” (which you can read here), in which he put it like this:
“Every country, now in the war, wished to avoid the German menace and tried to avoid war. Each changed its attitude from one of conciliation to one of a brave show of force many times, but very seldom did these brave shows of force coincide. Consequently Hitler was able to attack and overcome them one at a time. There can be little doubt but that if all the nations now occupied by Germany had withstood and attacked at the same time Germany would have been overrun as quickly as she overran the Low Countries. Or very likely if they had unequivocally stated their unity at the outset on this vital matter of solid common defence the Nazi attack would never have come. But this unity was not to be. Each nation first of all thought of itself and acted accordingly. On such a basis united and therefore effective and decisive action could never result. Even Britain and France were until the eleventh hour divided on a policy concerning the Nazi menace. That delay had its tragic influence upon the course of the war as we all know.”
Mark Field, by contrast, made a more interesting comment on the future of the relationship with America:
“Much as we have a good relationship with America, which is based on common language, and common history, it would be wrong to overstate the nature of that relationship. If we look at the large Hispanic population in America, and then spool forward a decade or so, I suspect that we will find few people talking about the special relationship between our two countries. Instead, American foreign policy will focus on its relationship with Europe.
“Although I instinctively agree with much of what my hon. Friend had to say about the importance of nation states, I also fear that the tremendous economic turmoil facing this country, and the world, will be with us for some years to come. We will hear increasing voices in this country—from across the political spectrum—calling for us to integrate with the power block in Europe. Remember, we eventually joined the EC in 1973 as a defence mechanism. We felt that the only way forward for this country was to latch ourselves on to Europe. That debate on our integration within an all-powerful European block will go on in the decades ahead. In the future, the world will be in blocks.”
In that light, the major question in the international sphere is how to arrange the relations between those blocks. A friendly relationship with America will be essential, but it will be managed best if Britain is part of Europe rather than attempting to go it alone.
¤ ¤ ¤
Here is a different take on the special relationship, by Peter Hitchens: http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2009/02/down-with-the-special-relationship.html
Posted by Richard Laming at 15:40
0 comments
The case of Binyam Mohamed
04 February 2009
I am not going to discuss here the rights and wrongs of the deletion of evidence from the judgment in the case of Binyam Mohamed – the foreign secretary insisted that intelligence material from the United States should not be published by the British courts (read a summary here) – but rather to consider the fact that the issue even arose at all. How can it be that the nature of the cooperation between two democracies cannot be examined in court given that it might be beneficial to one side in a legal dispute?
Isn’t the point of democracy that it places the interests of the individual first?
What we have is a stark example of the fundamental tension between, on the one hand, the demands of the security that defends our freedoms and, on the other, those freedoms themselves. (Let us neglect, for the time being, the suggestion that those freedoms have not in fact been protected by the security measures put in place.)
The apparatus of a security operation directed at the outside world must necessarily, in a world of interdependence, have consequences back home. The interests of the nation are not identical with the interests of the people who make up that nation. The idea that national sovereignty and individual freedom go hand in hand is simply untrue.
Isn’t the point of democracy that it places the interests of the individual first?
What we have is a stark example of the fundamental tension between, on the one hand, the demands of the security that defends our freedoms and, on the other, those freedoms themselves. (Let us neglect, for the time being, the suggestion that those freedoms have not in fact been protected by the security measures put in place.)
The apparatus of a security operation directed at the outside world must necessarily, in a world of interdependence, have consequences back home. The interests of the nation are not identical with the interests of the people who make up that nation. The idea that national sovereignty and individual freedom go hand in hand is simply untrue.
Posted by Richard Laming at 17:14
0 comments
British jobs for British workers
03 February 2009
Peter Oborne, writing in the Daily Mail, is correct to criticise Gordon Brown’s apparent commitment to “British jobs for British workers”, but he is wrong to say that “our membership of the European Union means there is nothing that a British government can do to protect British jobs.”
For where do British jobs come from? They come from a prosperous economy, with customers both at home and abroad willing and able to pay for the goods and services those British jobs produce. There is no surer way to reduce the spending power of domestic consumers by cutting them off from the international trading economy, and as soon as we impose restrictions on the activities of foreign companies, they will impose restrictions on our own.
The idea that there is a fixed amount of work to be done and that offering jobs to foreigners necessarily reduces the number of jobs for local workers is known as the lump of labour fallacy. It is generally discredited by economists, except in the lingering world of Peter Oborne. (Why are conservatives now advocating government intervention and protectionism?)
In the modern world, our economic health rises and falls with that of our trading partners, the major ones of which happen to be our closest neighbours in Europe. If we want to preserve British jobs for British workers, or even any kind of job for any kind of worker, international cooperation to overcome the recession and relaunch economic growth will be necessary. Our membership of the European Union makes us more able to do this, not less.
For where do British jobs come from? They come from a prosperous economy, with customers both at home and abroad willing and able to pay for the goods and services those British jobs produce. There is no surer way to reduce the spending power of domestic consumers by cutting them off from the international trading economy, and as soon as we impose restrictions on the activities of foreign companies, they will impose restrictions on our own.
The idea that there is a fixed amount of work to be done and that offering jobs to foreigners necessarily reduces the number of jobs for local workers is known as the lump of labour fallacy. It is generally discredited by economists, except in the lingering world of Peter Oborne. (Why are conservatives now advocating government intervention and protectionism?)
In the modern world, our economic health rises and falls with that of our trading partners, the major ones of which happen to be our closest neighbours in Europe. If we want to preserve British jobs for British workers, or even any kind of job for any kind of worker, international cooperation to overcome the recession and relaunch economic growth will be necessary. Our membership of the European Union makes us more able to do this, not less.
Posted by Richard Laming at 16:45
1 comments
Immobility
The dispute about Italian and Portuguese workers having jobs at a power station in Lincolnshire highlights the issue of labour mobility within the EU. One of the fundamental principles of the EU is that of the free movement of workers. The single market is founded on four freedoms – of goods, services, capital and labour – and they all need to go together. Restrictions on the movement of people alone would provoke criticisms from the political left: workers should have the same rights as bosses.
(Lionel Robbins identified the free flow of commerce across borders as a fundamental part of federalism in "Economic planning and international order" published in 1937. This is not a new idea.)
While the free movement of workers is fundamental to the nature of the EU, it is and always will be the exception to economic life and not the rule. At present, no more than a small percentage of the people of the European Union live in a member state other than their own, and it is a percentage that will not grow very much.
This fact is sometimes used by anti-Europeans to criticise the EU (for example, Daniel Hannan in the First Post today), but in fact it proves the opposite.
For the principal fear of Eurosceptics is of the loss of national identity amid a Europeanisation of life. But how can this happen when most people will remain happily resident in the place where they grew up?
Europe’s communities and identities are more resilient than the Eurosceptics give them credit for. National pride accompanies support for the idea of Europe and is not an obstacle to it.
(Lionel Robbins identified the free flow of commerce across borders as a fundamental part of federalism in "Economic planning and international order" published in 1937. This is not a new idea.)
While the free movement of workers is fundamental to the nature of the EU, it is and always will be the exception to economic life and not the rule. At present, no more than a small percentage of the people of the European Union live in a member state other than their own, and it is a percentage that will not grow very much.
This fact is sometimes used by anti-Europeans to criticise the EU (for example, Daniel Hannan in the First Post today), but in fact it proves the opposite.
For the principal fear of Eurosceptics is of the loss of national identity amid a Europeanisation of life. But how can this happen when most people will remain happily resident in the place where they grew up?
Europe’s communities and identities are more resilient than the Eurosceptics give them credit for. National pride accompanies support for the idea of Europe and is not an obstacle to it.
Posted by Richard Laming at 17:03
0 comments
A blanket of whiteness
As a blanket of whiteness spreads across the country, so too do strikes and protests against the employment of foreign workers. The anti-European free market right is enjoying the discomfort brought to the government, but is that really correct in view of what is going on.
First of all, there are wildcat, unofficial strikes and protests by workers and trade unions. One would expect the AEFMR to disapprove of that.
Next, the demand by the protesters is that companies ought to be subject to greater restrictions on whom they can employ and how much they can pay them. The AEFMR generally objects to that demand, too.
But the reason why those companies cannot be made subject to greater restrictions is because of the European single market. That is why the AEFMR is happy. People are protesting against Europe.
So, given the choice between defending the free market and opposing the European Union, the AEFMR prefers to criticise Europe. Now we know.
First of all, there are wildcat, unofficial strikes and protests by workers and trade unions. One would expect the AEFMR to disapprove of that.
Next, the demand by the protesters is that companies ought to be subject to greater restrictions on whom they can employ and how much they can pay them. The AEFMR generally objects to that demand, too.
But the reason why those companies cannot be made subject to greater restrictions is because of the European single market. That is why the AEFMR is happy. People are protesting against Europe.
So, given the choice between defending the free market and opposing the European Union, the AEFMR prefers to criticise Europe. Now we know.
Posted by Richard Laming at 11:33
1 comments
