19 September 2008
Finding an identity
18 September 2008
An interesting essay by immigration minister Liam Byrne, entitled “A more united kingdom”, deserved a better press than it got when it was published earlier this week.
Most attention was given to the suggestion that there should be a public holiday to celebrate of “Britishness” and the list of 27 things that might make up the day. (Read the whole essay here or the list of 27 ways to celebrate here.) It was obvious that such a list would attract the eye of the media, when it stretches to almost everything you can think of, including spending the day drinking. I liked the additional suggestion that being British meant to “locate the nearest American and spend the rest of the day doing everything he or she tells you to do”.
But there is a serious point behind Liam Byrne’s work which needs more thorough consideration.
A central notion in the debate about the future of Europe is whether there is a European demos, that is to say whether the people of Europe believe that they have enough in common to make a shared democracy work. Would a minority accept that it was outvoted in a legitimate manner? The federalist case is that such a demos is indeed developing, but it is a matter subject to evidence and debate.
The point behind Liam Byrne’s pamphlet is to strengthen the idea of a British demos. (Indeed, it was published by the thinktank with that very name.) But the overall government drive for a British demos is intended to deal with two different threats to it, and I fear that it will end up dealing with neither.
The first threat to Britishness comes from Scotland, and the growing demand for Scottish independence. This threat is felt particularly keenly by Scottish politicians at the head of UK-wide political parties, whose legitimacy to govern in England (and conceivably even their ability to govern in England) is in doubt because of their nationality. MPs for Scottish seats at Westminster would be cut adrift were Scotland to secede from the union. (There seems to be greater concern within the Labour party about the rise of the SNP than in the Conservative and Unionist party, contrary to what the core ideologies of those two parties might lead you to expect.)
The second threat, and the much more serious one, is the increasing alienation from the British political process among the young, the poor, and the ethnic minorities. There is disengagement not just from voting in elections but from public life and the notion of a British community as a whole. This is what the immigration minister is more concerned about.
He is right to say that establishing a shared identity is necessary in order to deal with this disengagement, and right also to point out that identities can be multi-faceted so that a British identity need not cancel out any others, but it would be wrong to think that a menu of citizenship ceremonies and public holidays will lead to a new sense of national shared purpose. Citizenship needs to be built on more than just a 19th century idea of patriotism.
Quite what form a future shared identity will take, no-one can know at present. But it will be unlike anything we know or have known before.
Most attention was given to the suggestion that there should be a public holiday to celebrate of “Britishness” and the list of 27 things that might make up the day. (Read the whole essay here or the list of 27 ways to celebrate here.) It was obvious that such a list would attract the eye of the media, when it stretches to almost everything you can think of, including spending the day drinking. I liked the additional suggestion that being British meant to “locate the nearest American and spend the rest of the day doing everything he or she tells you to do”.
But there is a serious point behind Liam Byrne’s work which needs more thorough consideration.
A central notion in the debate about the future of Europe is whether there is a European demos, that is to say whether the people of Europe believe that they have enough in common to make a shared democracy work. Would a minority accept that it was outvoted in a legitimate manner? The federalist case is that such a demos is indeed developing, but it is a matter subject to evidence and debate.
The point behind Liam Byrne’s pamphlet is to strengthen the idea of a British demos. (Indeed, it was published by the thinktank with that very name.) But the overall government drive for a British demos is intended to deal with two different threats to it, and I fear that it will end up dealing with neither.
The first threat to Britishness comes from Scotland, and the growing demand for Scottish independence. This threat is felt particularly keenly by Scottish politicians at the head of UK-wide political parties, whose legitimacy to govern in England (and conceivably even their ability to govern in England) is in doubt because of their nationality. MPs for Scottish seats at Westminster would be cut adrift were Scotland to secede from the union. (There seems to be greater concern within the Labour party about the rise of the SNP than in the Conservative and Unionist party, contrary to what the core ideologies of those two parties might lead you to expect.)
The second threat, and the much more serious one, is the increasing alienation from the British political process among the young, the poor, and the ethnic minorities. There is disengagement not just from voting in elections but from public life and the notion of a British community as a whole. This is what the immigration minister is more concerned about.
He is right to say that establishing a shared identity is necessary in order to deal with this disengagement, and right also to point out that identities can be multi-faceted so that a British identity need not cancel out any others, but it would be wrong to think that a menu of citizenship ceremonies and public holidays will lead to a new sense of national shared purpose. Citizenship needs to be built on more than just a 19th century idea of patriotism.
Quite what form a future shared identity will take, no-one can know at present. But it will be unlike anything we know or have known before.
¤ ¤ ¤
You can read an analysis of what makes up the idea of citizenship here:
http://www.federalunion.org.uk/acrobatfiles/background_papers.pdf
http://www.federalunion.org.uk/acrobatfiles/background_papers.pdf
Posted by Richard Laming at 15:37
1 comments
The timing of the euro
12 September 2008
There has been some debate in the media this week about the significance of statements by leading Liberal Democrats about their policy on joining the euro. Does this mean they care about it less?
Chris Huhne declared in an interview last weekend that “the truth is that within the British debate it's completely off the radar, and therefore there is simply no point in regarding it as a runner worth investing political time in.” This isn’t a reflection of what the Liberal Democrats think about the importance of the euro, but of what everyone else thinks about its importance.
And that’s a pity. At a time when the interconnections between different national economies are becoming more pronounced and more clear, the management of those interconnections becomes more important too. There is an important role for coordination between the different regulators of the major financial institutions, to create a regulatory regime that is consistent, transparent and reliable. If business is conducted on a transatlantic basis – Lehman Brothers used to ship money and assets back and forth between New York and London every week – then the regulation has got to be transatlantic too.
But what has sharing a currency got to do with this? Two things.
First, stepping in to the market to shore up tottering banks requires lots of cash, readily available. This is something that only central banks can do, and a large central bank can do this better than a small one. From the point of view of the UK, the European Central Bank would be a better vehicle for this than the Bank of England on its own.
Secondly, when it comes to rebuilding global economic activity in the aftermath of this mess, it is clear that those countries whose economies were artificially inflated by the housing and credit bubbles are going to have to manage a dignified decline. It is in everyone’s interest for this decline to be controlled rather than precipitate, because countries such as America and the UK remain good customers for the rest of the world’s exports, if a little less good than they used to be.
A key tool in managing that decline is the adjustment of exchange rates. Rather than being simply a price whose level can be left to the marketplace, the relative value of the world’s exchange rates is a matter of intense and vital political concern. The British voice in the debate about future exchange rate management will be weakened because Britain has a small offshore currency rather than one of the big three.
However, the time when Britain most needs to be in the euro is a time when Britain cannot join it. Membership will take longer to bring about. Staying out of the euro in 1997 looks even more like a short-term political decision now than it did then.
Chris Huhne declared in an interview last weekend that “the truth is that within the British debate it's completely off the radar, and therefore there is simply no point in regarding it as a runner worth investing political time in.” This isn’t a reflection of what the Liberal Democrats think about the importance of the euro, but of what everyone else thinks about its importance.
And that’s a pity. At a time when the interconnections between different national economies are becoming more pronounced and more clear, the management of those interconnections becomes more important too. There is an important role for coordination between the different regulators of the major financial institutions, to create a regulatory regime that is consistent, transparent and reliable. If business is conducted on a transatlantic basis – Lehman Brothers used to ship money and assets back and forth between New York and London every week – then the regulation has got to be transatlantic too.
But what has sharing a currency got to do with this? Two things.
First, stepping in to the market to shore up tottering banks requires lots of cash, readily available. This is something that only central banks can do, and a large central bank can do this better than a small one. From the point of view of the UK, the European Central Bank would be a better vehicle for this than the Bank of England on its own.
Secondly, when it comes to rebuilding global economic activity in the aftermath of this mess, it is clear that those countries whose economies were artificially inflated by the housing and credit bubbles are going to have to manage a dignified decline. It is in everyone’s interest for this decline to be controlled rather than precipitate, because countries such as America and the UK remain good customers for the rest of the world’s exports, if a little less good than they used to be.
A key tool in managing that decline is the adjustment of exchange rates. Rather than being simply a price whose level can be left to the marketplace, the relative value of the world’s exchange rates is a matter of intense and vital political concern. The British voice in the debate about future exchange rate management will be weakened because Britain has a small offshore currency rather than one of the big three.
However, the time when Britain most needs to be in the euro is a time when Britain cannot join it. Membership will take longer to bring about. Staying out of the euro in 1997 looks even more like a short-term political decision now than it did then.
Posted by Richard Laming at 11:09
0 comments
A fair trial for O J Simpson
11 September 2008
O J Simpson is in trouble again. This time he is on trial for kidnapping and robbery, having been acquitted famously of murder back in 1995. A problem for the courts, though, is finding a jury who can approach this case with an open mind. Is there anybody who doesn’t know what happened last time?
Somehow, this problem is going to have to be solved. Everybody, from the highest to the lowest, from the most famous to the most obscure, is entitled to a fair trial. It can be hard to arrange, maybe, but it needs to be done. The alternative is simply to let O J Simpson go, in which case the complaint about there being one law for celebrities and another law for the rest of us becomes ever more true.
The reason I write about it here is that we have heard this argument before, in the context of the trials of political leaders for crimes against humanity. These are unusual cases, people say, which can’t possibly be fair. The procedures used to deal with Slobodan Milosevic, say, were unjust and should not have been followed, and no-one in his position should ever be tried in that way.
I agree that high profile trials are difficult, but they are still necessary. The arguments used about the impossibility of bringing Milosevic to justice were really arguments about fame, not about politics. Heads of state should be just as much subject to the law as everyone else.
Somehow, this problem is going to have to be solved. Everybody, from the highest to the lowest, from the most famous to the most obscure, is entitled to a fair trial. It can be hard to arrange, maybe, but it needs to be done. The alternative is simply to let O J Simpson go, in which case the complaint about there being one law for celebrities and another law for the rest of us becomes ever more true.
The reason I write about it here is that we have heard this argument before, in the context of the trials of political leaders for crimes against humanity. These are unusual cases, people say, which can’t possibly be fair. The procedures used to deal with Slobodan Milosevic, say, were unjust and should not have been followed, and no-one in his position should ever be tried in that way.
I agree that high profile trials are difficult, but they are still necessary. The arguments used about the impossibility of bringing Milosevic to justice were really arguments about fame, not about politics. Heads of state should be just as much subject to the law as everyone else.
Posted by Richard Laming at 16:06
0 comments
Do referendums work in practice?
10 September 2008
A great many political ideas sound great in theory but need to prove themselves in practice. Proposals for reform of the electoral system have to pass this test, and, yes, federalism has to do so, too. But let me apply that test also to the idea of referendums.
The Irish government has published today some research into the referendum No vote in the summer. What were the reasons why people voted the way they did?
Of the No voters, 42 per cent said that they did not have enough information. 40 per cent voted No to protect Ireland’s low levels of corporate taxation. And one-third of No voters were concerned to prevent the introduction of conscription to a European army.
Of course, the Lisbon treaty had no bearing on corporate tax rates and certainly would not lead to conscription – it would not even lead to an army – so the lack of information is amply borne out.
So what kind of a constitutional device is it where the crucial decisions are taken by people so uninformed? We would not be happy if 42 per cent of jurors didn’t know what was going on in court cases.
The notion of a referendum makes fine theoretical sense, but it only works in practice if the voters are properly informed.
Of the issues that actually were at stake in the Lisbon treaty, such as the number of members of the European Commission, only four per cent thought this was a reason to vote No. This is one-tenth of the number who voted on the strength of misinformation about the tax system.
When the idea comes up of what could be done to satisfy the Irish people in order to make possible a second referendum, the discussion is about tweaking various aspects of the details of the treaty, but the Irish research shows that this is all beside the point. The referendum is a fine theoretical tool, but does not lead to popular judgement on the EU in practice.
It is not only in Ireland that there is this mismatch between theory and reality. Remember Iain Duncan Smith’s confession in the House of Commons, reported on this blog here, that he did not know what the referendum in 1975 was all about. If an eminent political figure like him can be so confused, what does this say about the rest of us?
Just so that I am not misunderstood, I like the idea of referendums on constitutional issues, but there are some formidable obstacles to overcome in practice.
The Irish government has published today some research into the referendum No vote in the summer. What were the reasons why people voted the way they did?
Of the No voters, 42 per cent said that they did not have enough information. 40 per cent voted No to protect Ireland’s low levels of corporate taxation. And one-third of No voters were concerned to prevent the introduction of conscription to a European army.
Of course, the Lisbon treaty had no bearing on corporate tax rates and certainly would not lead to conscription – it would not even lead to an army – so the lack of information is amply borne out.
So what kind of a constitutional device is it where the crucial decisions are taken by people so uninformed? We would not be happy if 42 per cent of jurors didn’t know what was going on in court cases.
The notion of a referendum makes fine theoretical sense, but it only works in practice if the voters are properly informed.
Of the issues that actually were at stake in the Lisbon treaty, such as the number of members of the European Commission, only four per cent thought this was a reason to vote No. This is one-tenth of the number who voted on the strength of misinformation about the tax system.
When the idea comes up of what could be done to satisfy the Irish people in order to make possible a second referendum, the discussion is about tweaking various aspects of the details of the treaty, but the Irish research shows that this is all beside the point. The referendum is a fine theoretical tool, but does not lead to popular judgement on the EU in practice.
It is not only in Ireland that there is this mismatch between theory and reality. Remember Iain Duncan Smith’s confession in the House of Commons, reported on this blog here, that he did not know what the referendum in 1975 was all about. If an eminent political figure like him can be so confused, what does this say about the rest of us?
Just so that I am not misunderstood, I like the idea of referendums on constitutional issues, but there are some formidable obstacles to overcome in practice.
Posted by Richard Laming at 17:30
1 comments
Regionalisation by stealth?
08 September 2008
One of the joys of writing a blog is the enquiries that come in. Here is one such:
“I don't understand how you can agree with Gordon Brown to stealthily foist a federal EU state upon the English and transpose it into convenient regions. We have never had an opportunity to openly debate the issue and vote on it. It is too serious an issue to leave to parliament, who are obliged to follow the will of the people, not their personal will or the will of the European Union. This entire process going on with all three parties politically afraid and the BBC avoiding any discussion if at all possible and drowning the public with dull, lowbrow programs, only distracts from the major changes that are occurring. You must not take advantage of the complacency and dullness of English people who go about their business. They will awaken one of these days, perhaps soon, and all of you will be in big trouble for having pretended virtue when you intend a slow motion, stultifying putsch. Winston Churchill would have been aghast at your plans. Please explain why you don't intend to push for a referendum for the English people?”
It can’t be often that Gordon Brown gets criticised for being too pro-European. Of all the people who have kept Britain from joining the euro, for example, he must be just about top of the list. I don’t see how the progress of European integration can be described as stealthy, either. The EU is founded on treaties that have been ratified in parliament, and its institutions and policies are quite widely publicised. Are newspapers like the Sun and the Daily Mail really conspiring to keep silent about the EU?
On the development of regional government in England, that is a separate and unconnected issue. The constitutional arrangements of each member state are a matter for it and it alone. After all, no-one complains that the EU is trying to break up Poland, do they.
I agree that there ought to be a far-reaching debate about the future of the British constitution, rather than the piecemeal changes that we have seen over the past few years. Changes here to be followed by changes there lead to an imbalance over all: the debate about independence in Scotland is an example of that, while hostility to the Barnett formula is another. The British constitution needs to be looked at in a comprehensive manner, not a partial one.
I happen to think that regional government for England makes sense. Many of the decision-making powers are already exercised at regional level, but by bureaucrats accountable to other bureaucrats. I would prefer regional decisions to be taken by elected politicians accountable to the electorate.
Putting the final constitutional settlement to a referendum would be an interesting move: it fits strongly with the European tradition of confirming fundamental political change, as opposed to the British practice of parliamentary democracy. It is nice to see that there are some things even Eurosceptics can learn from our neighbours. It occurs to me, though, that perhaps you mean a referendum on EU membership, in which case I wonder why the English are the only people to be asked to vote. The assumption that “the English people” and “the British people” are one and the same has got the former into a lot of trouble down the ages.
On the question of whether there should be a referendum in Britain on Europe as a whole, here is what we wrote in 2007:
http://www.federalunion.org.uk/news/2007/070620referendumbriefing.shtml
You open with Gordon Brown and conclude with Winston Churchill; so will I. Remember that Winston Churchill himself was an advocate of English regional government, as well as, more famously, being one of the leading figures behind of the idea of a united Europe in the aftermath of the second world war.
“I don't understand how you can agree with Gordon Brown to stealthily foist a federal EU state upon the English and transpose it into convenient regions. We have never had an opportunity to openly debate the issue and vote on it. It is too serious an issue to leave to parliament, who are obliged to follow the will of the people, not their personal will or the will of the European Union. This entire process going on with all three parties politically afraid and the BBC avoiding any discussion if at all possible and drowning the public with dull, lowbrow programs, only distracts from the major changes that are occurring. You must not take advantage of the complacency and dullness of English people who go about their business. They will awaken one of these days, perhaps soon, and all of you will be in big trouble for having pretended virtue when you intend a slow motion, stultifying putsch. Winston Churchill would have been aghast at your plans. Please explain why you don't intend to push for a referendum for the English people?”
It can’t be often that Gordon Brown gets criticised for being too pro-European. Of all the people who have kept Britain from joining the euro, for example, he must be just about top of the list. I don’t see how the progress of European integration can be described as stealthy, either. The EU is founded on treaties that have been ratified in parliament, and its institutions and policies are quite widely publicised. Are newspapers like the Sun and the Daily Mail really conspiring to keep silent about the EU?
On the development of regional government in England, that is a separate and unconnected issue. The constitutional arrangements of each member state are a matter for it and it alone. After all, no-one complains that the EU is trying to break up Poland, do they.
I agree that there ought to be a far-reaching debate about the future of the British constitution, rather than the piecemeal changes that we have seen over the past few years. Changes here to be followed by changes there lead to an imbalance over all: the debate about independence in Scotland is an example of that, while hostility to the Barnett formula is another. The British constitution needs to be looked at in a comprehensive manner, not a partial one.
I happen to think that regional government for England makes sense. Many of the decision-making powers are already exercised at regional level, but by bureaucrats accountable to other bureaucrats. I would prefer regional decisions to be taken by elected politicians accountable to the electorate.
Putting the final constitutional settlement to a referendum would be an interesting move: it fits strongly with the European tradition of confirming fundamental political change, as opposed to the British practice of parliamentary democracy. It is nice to see that there are some things even Eurosceptics can learn from our neighbours. It occurs to me, though, that perhaps you mean a referendum on EU membership, in which case I wonder why the English are the only people to be asked to vote. The assumption that “the English people” and “the British people” are one and the same has got the former into a lot of trouble down the ages.
On the question of whether there should be a referendum in Britain on Europe as a whole, here is what we wrote in 2007:
http://www.federalunion.org.uk/news/2007/070620referendumbriefing.shtml
You open with Gordon Brown and conclude with Winston Churchill; so will I. Remember that Winston Churchill himself was an advocate of English regional government, as well as, more famously, being one of the leading figures behind of the idea of a united Europe in the aftermath of the second world war.
Posted by Richard Laming at 15:54
2 comments
Giscard says opt-out
07 September 2008
A Eurosceptic thinktank, Global Vision, is holding a conference today to press the case for Britain to remove itself from the heart of the EU. They want a trading relationship, they say, but not much more than that. And anything that is agreed more than that must be agreed unanimously by intergovernmental methods. (Read about Global Vision here.)
They do not elevate opposition to the EU into a moral crusade, as do some of its critics; they do not make a fetish out of national sovereignty. It is not in Britain’s interests to take part in an integrated Europe, they say, but if other countries wish to do so, that is fine. In fact, given the evident wish of many other European countries to do exactly this, the negotiation of arrangements for Britain to leave should be perfectly possible. The fact that the EU is based on mutual and unanimous consent gives the UK a power over the rest: it can prevent the others from developing the EU further, if it wishes. Agreement would provide a welcome release for both parties, they say.
And in that light, it is only natural that they should find as allies advocates of an integrated Europe, integrated without Britain if need be. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former chairman of the European Convention that produced the first draft of the constitutional treaty, is lending his name to their efforts. He would prefer to see progress made in European integration, and is ready to sacrifice British membership in order to achieve it. (Read a report in the Daily Mail here.)
There is a logic behind this argument and, if British politics goes the wrong way, it is a logic that might come to fruition. But I disagree with both Global Vision and their foreign guest.
I don’t share Global Vision’s view of the EU, nor their view of what will become of a medium-sized country in the future when the world is dominated by four or five major powers, whether large countries or regionally integrated groupings. To watch such a world come to pass and deliberately opt out of membership of one of those regional groupings seems to me to be a mistake. The world desperately needs new rules to manage the relations between those major powers, and writing them is one of the pre-eminent tasks in politics today.
And as regards Giscard d’Estaing, I don’t think that Europe can achieve as much as he would like if Britain were not a member. Its economic and military clout would be reduced and its influence around the world diminished. On the other hand, there is a great deal it can do if Britain remains a member.
The biggest tasks facing the EU, such as adapting the economy to its ecological limits whilst maintaining competitiveness and social protection, maintaining democracy and social cohesion while its social, ethnic and religious diversity increases, and engaging in the international rule-writing I referred to earlier, are all tasks where Britain has something to offer the rest of Europe. When it comes to the UK, Giscard is choosing the wrong allies.
They do not elevate opposition to the EU into a moral crusade, as do some of its critics; they do not make a fetish out of national sovereignty. It is not in Britain’s interests to take part in an integrated Europe, they say, but if other countries wish to do so, that is fine. In fact, given the evident wish of many other European countries to do exactly this, the negotiation of arrangements for Britain to leave should be perfectly possible. The fact that the EU is based on mutual and unanimous consent gives the UK a power over the rest: it can prevent the others from developing the EU further, if it wishes. Agreement would provide a welcome release for both parties, they say.
And in that light, it is only natural that they should find as allies advocates of an integrated Europe, integrated without Britain if need be. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former chairman of the European Convention that produced the first draft of the constitutional treaty, is lending his name to their efforts. He would prefer to see progress made in European integration, and is ready to sacrifice British membership in order to achieve it. (Read a report in the Daily Mail here.)
There is a logic behind this argument and, if British politics goes the wrong way, it is a logic that might come to fruition. But I disagree with both Global Vision and their foreign guest.
I don’t share Global Vision’s view of the EU, nor their view of what will become of a medium-sized country in the future when the world is dominated by four or five major powers, whether large countries or regionally integrated groupings. To watch such a world come to pass and deliberately opt out of membership of one of those regional groupings seems to me to be a mistake. The world desperately needs new rules to manage the relations between those major powers, and writing them is one of the pre-eminent tasks in politics today.
And as regards Giscard d’Estaing, I don’t think that Europe can achieve as much as he would like if Britain were not a member. Its economic and military clout would be reduced and its influence around the world diminished. On the other hand, there is a great deal it can do if Britain remains a member.
The biggest tasks facing the EU, such as adapting the economy to its ecological limits whilst maintaining competitiveness and social protection, maintaining democracy and social cohesion while its social, ethnic and religious diversity increases, and engaging in the international rule-writing I referred to earlier, are all tasks where Britain has something to offer the rest of Europe. When it comes to the UK, Giscard is choosing the wrong allies.
Posted by Richard Laming at 15:53
3 comments
Is smoking democratic?
05 September 2008
More on Sarah Palin, I’m afraid. Her purported belief in creationism, which turns out on closer inspection to be nothing of the kind, has led to an interesting discussion about the role of received authority in political decision-making.
Christopher Caldwell, in the Financial Times (read it here) suggests that the refusal to discuss creationism – or its close relative Intelligent Design – in schools amounts to the overruling of the democratic process by experts. People who know more than you or I are telling us what we should study.
The ban on smoking is another example he quotes, where “In the US, at least, there was little democratic participation in the decision.” Maybe in America, but not in Britain. It’s been a political question, although the scientific evidence is so compelling that no serious political party has tried to challenge it.
Christopher Caldwell describes these debates as “a fight that pits technocrats against democrats.” No it doesn’t. It pits different groups of democrats against each other. It is perfectly legitimate, and indeed necessary, for politicians to debate how to react to the facts revealed by science. Those facts are not determined by democratic vote, but the policies should be.
Take climate change, for example. There are several different sets of policies that might be adopted, each with winners and losers. We shouldn’t accept that it is up to the scientists to tell us what to do. The question of how, or whether, to attempt to preserve our way of life is a controversial political question and should not be disguised as anything else.
The bigger question, from the point of view of this blog, is the extent to which the political structures permit those political discussions. In the case of the ban on smoking in pubs, it seems arguable to me that this should be decided locally. While it is a public health matter, it is also a matter of competition between pubs, and given that pubs where I live in London are not competing against pubs in Newcastle, why should they have the same laws? (One could say that public health concerns trump everything else, but I think that special case can anyway be made for pubs.)
At the other end of the scale, policies to fight climate change, if we want them, have to be enacted globally. The absence of suitable global institutions vitiates our concern about climate change, regardless of our democratic decision about how to react to the science. And that can’t be right.
Christopher Caldwell, in the Financial Times (read it here) suggests that the refusal to discuss creationism – or its close relative Intelligent Design – in schools amounts to the overruling of the democratic process by experts. People who know more than you or I are telling us what we should study.
The ban on smoking is another example he quotes, where “In the US, at least, there was little democratic participation in the decision.” Maybe in America, but not in Britain. It’s been a political question, although the scientific evidence is so compelling that no serious political party has tried to challenge it.
Christopher Caldwell describes these debates as “a fight that pits technocrats against democrats.” No it doesn’t. It pits different groups of democrats against each other. It is perfectly legitimate, and indeed necessary, for politicians to debate how to react to the facts revealed by science. Those facts are not determined by democratic vote, but the policies should be.
Take climate change, for example. There are several different sets of policies that might be adopted, each with winners and losers. We shouldn’t accept that it is up to the scientists to tell us what to do. The question of how, or whether, to attempt to preserve our way of life is a controversial political question and should not be disguised as anything else.
The bigger question, from the point of view of this blog, is the extent to which the political structures permit those political discussions. In the case of the ban on smoking in pubs, it seems arguable to me that this should be decided locally. While it is a public health matter, it is also a matter of competition between pubs, and given that pubs where I live in London are not competing against pubs in Newcastle, why should they have the same laws? (One could say that public health concerns trump everything else, but I think that special case can anyway be made for pubs.)
At the other end of the scale, policies to fight climate change, if we want them, have to be enacted globally. The absence of suitable global institutions vitiates our concern about climate change, regardless of our democratic decision about how to react to the science. And that can’t be right.
¤ ¤ ¤
More on Intelligent Design here, by the excellent A C Grayling.
Posted by Richard Laming at 11:54
0 comments
Change in America
02 September 2008
Every other blog is writing about Sarah Palin, Republican nominee for vice-president of the United States, so why shouldn’t this one. Not for Federal Union, though, speculation about her private life or her daughter’s private life: instead, a reflection on geopolitics and the future of the transatlantic relationship.
It’s all about the A states, you see. John McCain represents Arizona and Mrs Palin is governor of Alaska. Both are on the western side of the United States, looking towards the Pacific and China, rather than on the east coast, looking towards Europe. Democrat VP candidate Joe Biden is a traditional east-coaster: he has an Irish Catholic background, grew up in Pennsylvania and now represents Delaware. (Barack Obama, of course, aspires to being a citizen of the world.)
It has long been a trend in American life that the centre of gravity is moving from the north and east to the south and west. More goods now flow back and forth across the Pacific than across the Atlantic. Demographically, the population of the sunshine belt is rising much faster than that of the rustbelt, while the main countries that send immigrants to the United States are also in the south and east. Of the top twelve countries, five are in Asia and seven are in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The nomination of Sarah Palin is a reflection of this. More and more of American politics, too, will come from the south and west. Economics and demographics have their consequences.
One question is whether America is ready for this change, but another is whether Europe is ready. For decades, Europeans have been able to assume that Americans are just people like us, only living on the other side of the Atlantic – if you go back far enough, that is exactly what the founders of the United States were – but is that true any longer?
American interests around the world are diverging from European ones, not because of political or ideological choice but because of some objective facts. The choice facing Europe is how to react to those facts. It is not only America that has to change.
It’s all about the A states, you see. John McCain represents Arizona and Mrs Palin is governor of Alaska. Both are on the western side of the United States, looking towards the Pacific and China, rather than on the east coast, looking towards Europe. Democrat VP candidate Joe Biden is a traditional east-coaster: he has an Irish Catholic background, grew up in Pennsylvania and now represents Delaware. (Barack Obama, of course, aspires to being a citizen of the world.)
It has long been a trend in American life that the centre of gravity is moving from the north and east to the south and west. More goods now flow back and forth across the Pacific than across the Atlantic. Demographically, the population of the sunshine belt is rising much faster than that of the rustbelt, while the main countries that send immigrants to the United States are also in the south and east. Of the top twelve countries, five are in Asia and seven are in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The nomination of Sarah Palin is a reflection of this. More and more of American politics, too, will come from the south and west. Economics and demographics have their consequences.
One question is whether America is ready for this change, but another is whether Europe is ready. For decades, Europeans have been able to assume that Americans are just people like us, only living on the other side of the Atlantic – if you go back far enough, that is exactly what the founders of the United States were – but is that true any longer?
American interests around the world are diverging from European ones, not because of political or ideological choice but because of some objective facts. The choice facing Europe is how to react to those facts. It is not only America that has to change.
Posted by Richard Laming at 10:48
1 comments
A report on the House of Lords reveals too much centralisation in England
An elegant investigation by the New Local Government Network has revealed that members of the appointed House of Lords are not evenly spread across the country. A disproportionate number live in London and the south east of England. (Read the report here.)
London provides nearly twice as many peers as it should (22 per cent of the total rather than 12 per cent) and the south east of England 50 per cent more (18 per cent rather than 13 per cent). Underrepresented areas include Yorkshire (5 per cent rather than 8 per cent), the West Midlands (4 per cent rather than 9 per cent), and the East Midlands (3 per cent rather than 7 per cent). Interestingly, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do all right: the problem is an imbalance within England.
Given that members of the House of Lords are normally chosen from among people who have achieved some kind of success in their careers or prominence in public life, this shows the centralisation of English business and politics in rather a dramatic form. It also means that the ability of the House of Lords properly to represent England is severely reduced.
The NLGN avoids drawing strong conclusions from this research, recommending instead that the future composition of the House of Lords should be balanced across the country. Fair enough, but the difference between England and the other constituent nations of the United Kingdom shows that the problem of over-centralisation is not confined to the House of Lords but applies to the whole of English public and political life.
London provides nearly twice as many peers as it should (22 per cent of the total rather than 12 per cent) and the south east of England 50 per cent more (18 per cent rather than 13 per cent). Underrepresented areas include Yorkshire (5 per cent rather than 8 per cent), the West Midlands (4 per cent rather than 9 per cent), and the East Midlands (3 per cent rather than 7 per cent). Interestingly, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do all right: the problem is an imbalance within England.
Given that members of the House of Lords are normally chosen from among people who have achieved some kind of success in their careers or prominence in public life, this shows the centralisation of English business and politics in rather a dramatic form. It also means that the ability of the House of Lords properly to represent England is severely reduced.
The NLGN avoids drawing strong conclusions from this research, recommending instead that the future composition of the House of Lords should be balanced across the country. Fair enough, but the difference between England and the other constituent nations of the United Kingdom shows that the problem of over-centralisation is not confined to the House of Lords but applies to the whole of English public and political life.
Posted by Richard Laming at 19:05
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