31 October 2007
A visit by the Saudi king (continued)
30 October 2007
It is one thing to note how the Saudi king can be invited to make a state visit; it is a different question as to whether he should be. If diplomacy can sometimes be useful, there are degrees of diplomacy and degrees of usefulness. Do diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia require a state visit by the Saudi king? His government is pretty unpleasant by any standards: does he deserve the ultimate in British hospitality?
There can be no absolute argument one way or another. The whole point of diplomacy is that it is an expression of compromise, so the fact that Saudi Arabia might be an exceptionally intolerant place is not a reason in itself to refuse a state visit. Some commentators have noted that Gordon Brown refuses to meet Robert Mugabe at the EU-Africa summit next month, but is happy to play host to King Abdullah. Those are the compromises on which diplomacy is built.
A second reason why it is hard to be definitive is that it is hard to know what a state visit actually means. Diplomacy, in its purest sense, is words and not action. We can invite the Saudi king here, treat him well, and still not change our policies towards his country if we wish. Alternatively, we could have refused to invite him and still deal with Saudi Arabia on exceptionally generous terms. Diplomatic relations are a veil behind which the real business is done: all we see is the motorcade down The Mall; we do not get to look behind the veil.
By contrast, compare the EU’s dealings with Serbia. It has negotiated a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, but refuses to sign it until Serbia cooperates fully with the International Crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, most notably by arresting and handing over for trial Ratko Mladic. That is action and not words. As long as Serbia fails to comply, it will remain outside the European process. No such pressure is brought to bear on Saudi Arabia, but then there is probably no such leverage either.
Saudi Arabia is a key player in the many of the conflicts and crises around the Middle East – the war in Iraq, the tension with Iran, the continuing problem with Israel and the Palestinians – and, given that we need its help (or at least not its active opposition) to achieve our objectives on those questions, there is not much we can do. Politeness is probably a wise course of action, in all the circumstances.
In that light, I think that Vincent Cable, acting leader of the Liberal Democrats, should have been willing to attend the state banquet held as part of the visit. He has complained about the Saudi human rights record, but as I have said, this is only a state visit and not anything more important. It is interesting that he was invited to attend: state visits are not just contact with the government of the day but with our whole political system.
That is not to say that he has to support government policies, but it is to say that friendly relations are better than antagonistic ones, and the rules of gracious behaviour still apply. (For the same reason, I think it was wrong for the president of Columbia University to harangue President Ahmedinejad before he spoke in New York in September.) We don’t have to like them but we do have to deal with them. It is only diplomacy, after all.
There can be no absolute argument one way or another. The whole point of diplomacy is that it is an expression of compromise, so the fact that Saudi Arabia might be an exceptionally intolerant place is not a reason in itself to refuse a state visit. Some commentators have noted that Gordon Brown refuses to meet Robert Mugabe at the EU-Africa summit next month, but is happy to play host to King Abdullah. Those are the compromises on which diplomacy is built.
A second reason why it is hard to be definitive is that it is hard to know what a state visit actually means. Diplomacy, in its purest sense, is words and not action. We can invite the Saudi king here, treat him well, and still not change our policies towards his country if we wish. Alternatively, we could have refused to invite him and still deal with Saudi Arabia on exceptionally generous terms. Diplomatic relations are a veil behind which the real business is done: all we see is the motorcade down The Mall; we do not get to look behind the veil.
By contrast, compare the EU’s dealings with Serbia. It has negotiated a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, but refuses to sign it until Serbia cooperates fully with the International Crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, most notably by arresting and handing over for trial Ratko Mladic. That is action and not words. As long as Serbia fails to comply, it will remain outside the European process. No such pressure is brought to bear on Saudi Arabia, but then there is probably no such leverage either.
Saudi Arabia is a key player in the many of the conflicts and crises around the Middle East – the war in Iraq, the tension with Iran, the continuing problem with Israel and the Palestinians – and, given that we need its help (or at least not its active opposition) to achieve our objectives on those questions, there is not much we can do. Politeness is probably a wise course of action, in all the circumstances.
In that light, I think that Vincent Cable, acting leader of the Liberal Democrats, should have been willing to attend the state banquet held as part of the visit. He has complained about the Saudi human rights record, but as I have said, this is only a state visit and not anything more important. It is interesting that he was invited to attend: state visits are not just contact with the government of the day but with our whole political system.
That is not to say that he has to support government policies, but it is to say that friendly relations are better than antagonistic ones, and the rules of gracious behaviour still apply. (For the same reason, I think it was wrong for the president of Columbia University to harangue President Ahmedinejad before he spoke in New York in September.) We don’t have to like them but we do have to deal with them. It is only diplomacy, after all.
Posted by Richard Laming at 17:59
0 comments
A visit by the Saudi king
I have written before on this blog about the drawbacks of diplomacy. The state visit by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia seems like a good occasion to write about the positive side.
It is a simple fact that the world contains many countries with whom we have to have dealings but with whom we disagree on many important questions. The Saudis, for example, might very well object to the disgusting way in which women can drive cars here and cast votes, but they have to put up with it because they need to sell us their oil and buy our armaments. Such are the compromises they find themselves forced to make. Diplomacy is the means by which those compromises are made.
It enables communication between different countries whose systems and habits would otherwise be incompatible. The fact that we are talking to another country does not mean that we like them, merely that we have to talk to them. The methods of diplomacy keep them at arms length.
A similar concept applies with computers. There are file formats like ASCII and Postscript that are not particularly practical in themselves but which enable files to be taken from one computer to another or from a computer to a printer. Diplomacy is like that: not very good, but sometimes useful.
It is a simple fact that the world contains many countries with whom we have to have dealings but with whom we disagree on many important questions. The Saudis, for example, might very well object to the disgusting way in which women can drive cars here and cast votes, but they have to put up with it because they need to sell us their oil and buy our armaments. Such are the compromises they find themselves forced to make. Diplomacy is the means by which those compromises are made.
It enables communication between different countries whose systems and habits would otherwise be incompatible. The fact that we are talking to another country does not mean that we like them, merely that we have to talk to them. The methods of diplomacy keep them at arms length.
A similar concept applies with computers. There are file formats like ASCII and Postscript that are not particularly practical in themselves but which enable files to be taken from one computer to another or from a computer to a printer. Diplomacy is like that: not very good, but sometimes useful.
Posted by Richard Laming at 22:50
0 comments
The Reform Treaty and the euro
29 October 2007
An enquiry comes in as to whether the Reform Treaty has any implications for Britain’s opt-out from the euro. Despite what some Eurosceptic conspiracy theorists have sometimes suggested, the answer is no. Britain remains outside the single currency. That may be a pity, but it’s also a fact.
One could go further and say that actually it’s the other way round: the euro has had an impact on the Reform Treaty. Let me explain.
When the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, I don’t suppose that many people thought the British and Danish opt-out from the euro would have lasted so long. It was thought of as a temporary means to secure agreement at the time, with each of the two opting-out countries likely to revise its opinion soon. As it turned out, the Danish voted No in a referendum in 2000 while the UK did not even get that close. The euro, however, while weakened by the absence of the pound and the krone, has nevertheless survived and grown more established.
The lesson is that opt-outs can work. While it is necessary that every member state agrees to each treaty, it is not necessary that all aspects of each treaty should apply to every member state. It is open for a member state to agree that certain provisions should apply to the others but not itself. Many aspects of the Reform Treaty are founded on this basis.
The UK has been an enthusiastic adopter of this principle in terms of justice and home affairs, and also on the Charter for Fundamental Rights. Other countries – Ireland, Poland – are doing the same. And the rest of the EU was ready to agree. It was better to allow an opt-out than to provoke an argument. It was true at Maastricht and it remained true in Lisbon. So much for the argument that there is a relentless conveyor belt towards an integrated Europe: participation remains a national choice.
One could go further and say that actually it’s the other way round: the euro has had an impact on the Reform Treaty. Let me explain.
When the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, I don’t suppose that many people thought the British and Danish opt-out from the euro would have lasted so long. It was thought of as a temporary means to secure agreement at the time, with each of the two opting-out countries likely to revise its opinion soon. As it turned out, the Danish voted No in a referendum in 2000 while the UK did not even get that close. The euro, however, while weakened by the absence of the pound and the krone, has nevertheless survived and grown more established.
The lesson is that opt-outs can work. While it is necessary that every member state agrees to each treaty, it is not necessary that all aspects of each treaty should apply to every member state. It is open for a member state to agree that certain provisions should apply to the others but not itself. Many aspects of the Reform Treaty are founded on this basis.
The UK has been an enthusiastic adopter of this principle in terms of justice and home affairs, and also on the Charter for Fundamental Rights. Other countries – Ireland, Poland – are doing the same. And the rest of the EU was ready to agree. It was better to allow an opt-out than to provoke an argument. It was true at Maastricht and it remained true in Lisbon. So much for the argument that there is a relentless conveyor belt towards an integrated Europe: participation remains a national choice.
Posted by Richard Laming at 15:48
2 comments
Homeless and helpless
23 October 2007
I remember there used to be a campaign in London on behalf of homeless people called “Homeless, not helpless”. Tory policy on Europe risks being both.
It is well-known that the Tories are against the Reform Treaty and also in favour of a referendum on that treaty, partly as a means of embarrassing Gordon Brown and partly as a means of stopping the treaty altogether. They are faced, though, with the prospect that the government will face down the demands for a referendum and also force the treaty through parliament so that, by the time of the next election, it has come into force. (The planned timetable is that the treaty will be ratified during 2008 to take effect from 1 January 2009, certainly in time for the next European elections in June of that year. The British general election, by contrast, has no fixed date, but is not likely to be held before May 2009 at the earliest.)
The question provoked by Tory demands for a treaty referendum while in opposition is what they would do were they to form a government after the next election. Would they try to undo ratification and hold a referendum then?
46 Conservative MPs have signed an Early Day Motion to that effect – read the text of the EDM here - but David Cameron is resisting the temptation. Mark Mardell, on his blog, suggests that the reason for the reticence is that renegotiating the treaty would dominate the Tory government’s first term in office and get in the way of his other priorities. I think there is more to it than that.
First, to go into the next election with a commitment to hold a referendum would push Europe up the agenda in the eyes of the voters and, as David Cameron has learned, the Tories do not benefit when that happens. Opposition to the EU sits oddly with the rest of his modernising agenda and he does not want to repeat the experience of William Hague and Michael Howard who tried to win a general election on the issue of Europe and lost it instead.
Secondly, a referendum that rejected the Reform Treaty would force Britain out of the EU altogether, which David Cameron claims not to want. It would be almost impossible to negotiate a new settlement with the other 26 member states, given how committed they are to the treaty after 7 long years of negotiation and debate. The Financial Times on 24 October reported a Tory party official as saying that calls for a post-ratification referendum on the Reform Treaty were “rather like buying back a house after you’ve sold it. You can do that but only if the people want to sell it.”
If that is true of the treaty after ratification, it is also true of the treaty now, too. Even now, alternative proposals for EU reform would require unanimous agreement among the member states. But where is the support elsewhere in Europe for them? The only option would be to leave the EU and negotiate a new relationship from the outside. Eurosceptic opposition to the Reform Treaty risks leaving Britain homeless as well as helpless.
It is well-known that the Tories are against the Reform Treaty and also in favour of a referendum on that treaty, partly as a means of embarrassing Gordon Brown and partly as a means of stopping the treaty altogether. They are faced, though, with the prospect that the government will face down the demands for a referendum and also force the treaty through parliament so that, by the time of the next election, it has come into force. (The planned timetable is that the treaty will be ratified during 2008 to take effect from 1 January 2009, certainly in time for the next European elections in June of that year. The British general election, by contrast, has no fixed date, but is not likely to be held before May 2009 at the earliest.)
The question provoked by Tory demands for a treaty referendum while in opposition is what they would do were they to form a government after the next election. Would they try to undo ratification and hold a referendum then?
46 Conservative MPs have signed an Early Day Motion to that effect – read the text of the EDM here - but David Cameron is resisting the temptation. Mark Mardell, on his blog, suggests that the reason for the reticence is that renegotiating the treaty would dominate the Tory government’s first term in office and get in the way of his other priorities. I think there is more to it than that.
First, to go into the next election with a commitment to hold a referendum would push Europe up the agenda in the eyes of the voters and, as David Cameron has learned, the Tories do not benefit when that happens. Opposition to the EU sits oddly with the rest of his modernising agenda and he does not want to repeat the experience of William Hague and Michael Howard who tried to win a general election on the issue of Europe and lost it instead.
Secondly, a referendum that rejected the Reform Treaty would force Britain out of the EU altogether, which David Cameron claims not to want. It would be almost impossible to negotiate a new settlement with the other 26 member states, given how committed they are to the treaty after 7 long years of negotiation and debate. The Financial Times on 24 October reported a Tory party official as saying that calls for a post-ratification referendum on the Reform Treaty were “rather like buying back a house after you’ve sold it. You can do that but only if the people want to sell it.”
If that is true of the treaty after ratification, it is also true of the treaty now, too. Even now, alternative proposals for EU reform would require unanimous agreement among the member states. But where is the support elsewhere in Europe for them? The only option would be to leave the EU and negotiate a new relationship from the outside. Eurosceptic opposition to the Reform Treaty risks leaving Britain homeless as well as helpless.
Posted by Richard Laming at 21:38
1 comments
Brussels jam
19 October 2007
A nonsensical article by Boris Johnson in the Daily Telegraph last week (you can read it here).
He argues that Qualified Majority Voting in the EU should be unravelled, and that the Reform Treaty should therefore be rejected. But that argument does not add up.
The Qualified Majority Voting from which he proposes to protect Britain's jam-makers is a consequence of the Single European Act and not the proposed new Reform Treaty. It is already in force and would remain in force even if the new treaty were to be rejected.
To remove jam-making from the scope of QMV would require either unanimous agreement among the 27 member states to reintroduce a national veto into the treaties for this purpose or for Britain to leave the European single market altogether.
What Boris Johnson should do, in his next column, is to name those member states that agree with his proposal to extend the national veto. Failing that, he should confirm that he thinks that Britain should withdraw from the single market. If he can’t do either of those, everyone can conclude that he is making a promise he is not willing to keep. That is not what the country expects from its politicians (although maybe we’ve grown used to it from the Eurosceptics).
He argues that Qualified Majority Voting in the EU should be unravelled, and that the Reform Treaty should therefore be rejected. But that argument does not add up.
The Qualified Majority Voting from which he proposes to protect Britain's jam-makers is a consequence of the Single European Act and not the proposed new Reform Treaty. It is already in force and would remain in force even if the new treaty were to be rejected.
To remove jam-making from the scope of QMV would require either unanimous agreement among the 27 member states to reintroduce a national veto into the treaties for this purpose or for Britain to leave the European single market altogether.
What Boris Johnson should do, in his next column, is to name those member states that agree with his proposal to extend the national veto. Failing that, he should confirm that he thinks that Britain should withdraw from the single market. If he can’t do either of those, everyone can conclude that he is making a promise he is not willing to keep. That is not what the country expects from its politicians (although maybe we’ve grown used to it from the Eurosceptics).
Posted by Richard Laming at 20:02
0 comments
News from Lisbon about the new treaty
17 October 2007
A report from the House of Commons European Scrutiny committee earlier this month complained about the procedure that had been followed in drawing up the new Reform Treaty. It objected to “an essentially secret drafting process conducted by the Presidency, with texts produced at the last moment before pressing for agreement. The compressed timetable now proposed, having regard to the sitting terms of national parliaments, could not have been better designed to
marginalise their role.”
Read the whole report here.
The process of negotiation conducted by the German presidency was investigated and criticised by Jan Seifert on his blog here: http://blog.jan-seifert.de/?p=120
The problem of the secret negotiations has not ended with the German presidency, of course: the Portuguese are continuing the tradition. The national governments like it that way because they can say one thing to their counterparts in other countries and something different to the press afterwards. Here is an example.
The Guardian reports that in the last minute discussions, Gordon Brown “moved to stop the European parliament having a veto over the appointment of the president of the commission.”
Read the report here - in the 11.30 briefing.
Now, the European Parliament has had such a veto since the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 – prior that, it had to be merely “consulted”. To supporters of parliamentary democracy in Europe, the role of the EP in choosing the president of the Commission is extremely important. It is barely conceivable that it should be reduced, and certainly not without a fight.
So, what has Gordon Brown actually done? Did the issue arise, or not? If it did, what was agreed? At the time of writing, there does not seem to be a final text of last night’s agreement on the web, so I cannot check what the final deal is. When I can, I will post an update here.
The Guardian blog on the Lisbon summit is not entirely unquestioning of the official statements. The big issue, though, is “whether or not Gordon did in fact have a glass of champagne last night. I've heard two conflicting reports. The question is, is there photographic evidence?” Good to know that the media is active on the European question ...
marginalise their role.”
Read the whole report here.
The process of negotiation conducted by the German presidency was investigated and criticised by Jan Seifert on his blog here: http://blog.jan-seifert.de/?p=120
The problem of the secret negotiations has not ended with the German presidency, of course: the Portuguese are continuing the tradition. The national governments like it that way because they can say one thing to their counterparts in other countries and something different to the press afterwards. Here is an example.
The Guardian reports that in the last minute discussions, Gordon Brown “moved to stop the European parliament having a veto over the appointment of the president of the commission.”
Read the report here - in the 11.30 briefing.
Now, the European Parliament has had such a veto since the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 – prior that, it had to be merely “consulted”. To supporters of parliamentary democracy in Europe, the role of the EP in choosing the president of the Commission is extremely important. It is barely conceivable that it should be reduced, and certainly not without a fight.
So, what has Gordon Brown actually done? Did the issue arise, or not? If it did, what was agreed? At the time of writing, there does not seem to be a final text of last night’s agreement on the web, so I cannot check what the final deal is. When I can, I will post an update here.
The Guardian blog on the Lisbon summit is not entirely unquestioning of the official statements. The big issue, though, is “whether or not Gordon did in fact have a glass of champagne last night. I've heard two conflicting reports. The question is, is there photographic evidence?” Good to know that the media is active on the European question ...
Posted by Richard Laming at 15:16
2 comments
Glaring stupidity
08 October 2007
My eye is drawn to an exchange in the Financial Times (you can read it here).
The debate about subsidiarity in the article and the response is very interesting, but it speaks for itself and I will not repeat it. The point about the consultation, though, is also important: the article claims it produced 117 replies. Now, I don’t know whether 117 is a lot or a little – much will depend on the extent of the impact of the proposal and on some issues, there might be only a very few stakeholders affected at all – but the implication is that in this case it is not very many.
To generate more interest in European proposals, or rather to ensure that whatever interest lies latent can actually be expressed, depends principally on the media. The European Commission has its routines of openness to make the information available (and there may well be some improvements here too), but modern life depends on the media to fill the gap between politics and the public. Journalists might look closer home in apportioning blame.
The debate about subsidiarity in the article and the response is very interesting, but it speaks for itself and I will not repeat it. The point about the consultation, though, is also important: the article claims it produced 117 replies. Now, I don’t know whether 117 is a lot or a little – much will depend on the extent of the impact of the proposal and on some issues, there might be only a very few stakeholders affected at all – but the implication is that in this case it is not very many.
To generate more interest in European proposals, or rather to ensure that whatever interest lies latent can actually be expressed, depends principally on the media. The European Commission has its routines of openness to make the information available (and there may well be some improvements here too), but modern life depends on the media to fill the gap between politics and the public. Journalists might look closer home in apportioning blame.
Posted by Richard Laming at 09:46
1 comments
Global Parliament
02 October 2007
A series of programmes on the BBC looks at democracy in practice, and includes an opinion poll conducted in 15 countries around the world. (Read the survey here.)
Naturally, anything regarding democracy on the BBC attracts the interest of this blog. In particular, I was wondering how the survey would deal with the idea of democracy at the international level. Would it be rejected? Would it simply be ignored? In fact, there was a question in the survey on the subject, asking “How likely would you be to support a Global Parliament, where votes are based on country population sizes, and the global parliament is able to make binding policies?”
The possible answers were as follows:
Very likely - it is a good idea
Quite likely - but with reservations
Neither likely nor unlikely
Quite unlikely - but it might work
Very unlikely - it is a bad idea
Don’t know/Refused (Do not prompt)
Now, I am as much committed to the idea of global democracy as anybody, and even my answer would have been only “Quite likely - but with reservations”. Let me explain why.
There are two reasons why the description of a proposed global parliament is incomplete: its powers, and its composition.
First, the idea of “binding policies” needs to be qualified by the idea of subsidiarity. Whatever the powers of the global institutions, they should be limited to policy areas with which lower levels of government cannot deal adequately on their own. The limitation of the emission of greenhouse gases in order to fight climate change is a perfect example of the kind of issue that needs to be dealt with at global level: no country can on its own follow policies that will be effective. Quite often, the fact that no single country can fight climate change is used as an argument against groups of countries fighting climate change: of course, that is nonsense but it depends on how those countries cooperate together. This is the second reason for my reservations.
Any global parliamentary chamber, representing the people, needs to be accompanied by a chamber that represents the states. The best way to do this is to aim for equal representation of citizens in one chamber and an equal representation of states in the other. The US system works on this basis; the European Union has something similar. On this view, it doesn’t make sense to talk in terms of a global parliament with seats allocated according to population without also mentioning the one vote per country chamber, too, and the need to get a majority in each chamber. So, two reservations but nevertheless a good idea.
Naturally, anything regarding democracy on the BBC attracts the interest of this blog. In particular, I was wondering how the survey would deal with the idea of democracy at the international level. Would it be rejected? Would it simply be ignored? In fact, there was a question in the survey on the subject, asking “How likely would you be to support a Global Parliament, where votes are based on country population sizes, and the global parliament is able to make binding policies?”
The possible answers were as follows:
Very likely - it is a good idea
Quite likely - but with reservations
Neither likely nor unlikely
Quite unlikely - but it might work
Very unlikely - it is a bad idea
Don’t know/Refused (Do not prompt)
Now, I am as much committed to the idea of global democracy as anybody, and even my answer would have been only “Quite likely - but with reservations”. Let me explain why.
There are two reasons why the description of a proposed global parliament is incomplete: its powers, and its composition.
First, the idea of “binding policies” needs to be qualified by the idea of subsidiarity. Whatever the powers of the global institutions, they should be limited to policy areas with which lower levels of government cannot deal adequately on their own. The limitation of the emission of greenhouse gases in order to fight climate change is a perfect example of the kind of issue that needs to be dealt with at global level: no country can on its own follow policies that will be effective. Quite often, the fact that no single country can fight climate change is used as an argument against groups of countries fighting climate change: of course, that is nonsense but it depends on how those countries cooperate together. This is the second reason for my reservations.
Any global parliamentary chamber, representing the people, needs to be accompanied by a chamber that represents the states. The best way to do this is to aim for equal representation of citizens in one chamber and an equal representation of states in the other. The US system works on this basis; the European Union has something similar. On this view, it doesn’t make sense to talk in terms of a global parliament with seats allocated according to population without also mentioning the one vote per country chamber, too, and the need to get a majority in each chamber. So, two reservations but nevertheless a good idea.
Posted by Richard Laming at 20:00
1 comments
Crisis in Belgium?
The Eurosceptic press has been delighting lately in the Belgian political crisis, in which no new government has been established since the general election back in June. Speculation is growing that the only solution to the impasse will be the break-up of the country altogether. It is famously composed of two regions, Flanders (Dutch-speaking) and Wallonia (French-speaking), and less famously of a third region, Brussels (where they speak almost everything), and might readily break up into those regions within the EU. For many policies, power is already devolved to the regions – agriculture, for example – and the chair of the EU’s Research Council was held by a minister from Brussels during the most recent Belgian presidency. Debate is therefore real over what powers still remain for the Belgian federal level.
The Eurosceptic press is loving it. The word “Brussels” has come to represent everything they don’t like, and drawing a distinction between the EU institutions, based in Brussels, and the Belgian government, based in Brussels, seems to be quite hard for them. Furthermore, some of them are taking the opportunity to say that the political crisis in Belgium shows how bad it is when you try to force together different communities in the same political unit if they in fact have nothing in common. This, they say, is what the EU is doing too, and that the EU had better stop doing it.
Allow me to interject a few facts. First, Belgium was created in 1830, so a political difficulty after 177 years is hardly evidence of a flawed political system. Next, the politicians who are pushing hardest for the break-up of Belgium are precisely the ones who have the least love for the EU. Flemish nationalists are at least consistent in their nationalism. Thirdly, a major reason why Belgian politics is not currently serving as a unifying force is the absence of federal political parties. Belgian political parties are in fact regional, aspiring also to play a role at the federal level. The weakness of their federal presence is a problem, not a good thing. (It is no accident that European federalists are arguing for stronger political parties at the European level.)
Lastly, even if Belgium should break up, is that such a disaster? It is not as if Belgium will disappear altogether. The cities of Bruges and Ghent are not going to slip beneath the waves; Holland is not going to acquire a south coast; life will go on, if in smaller political units. C E M Joad in “Why war?” wrote about how smaller political units might actually be better, not worse, because they are less tempted by the illusory glory of military might. Denmark was his example then (in 1939) compared with its immediate southern neighbour. (The crisis in Belgium has been followed closely in Scotland and Catalonia, too, where they are disinterested but not uninterested.)
And, approaching this question from the other direction, if the Eurosceptics are right and any “artificial” political unit is inevitably going to break up, the existence of the European Union makes it possible for that break up to be managed. An EU conceived as a union of states and citizens will better cope with new, smaller member states, than one conceived as a union of states alone.
There are lessons for the EU arising from the current problems in Belgium, but they are the opposite of the lessons that Eurosceptics are hoping to learn.
The Eurosceptic press is loving it. The word “Brussels” has come to represent everything they don’t like, and drawing a distinction between the EU institutions, based in Brussels, and the Belgian government, based in Brussels, seems to be quite hard for them. Furthermore, some of them are taking the opportunity to say that the political crisis in Belgium shows how bad it is when you try to force together different communities in the same political unit if they in fact have nothing in common. This, they say, is what the EU is doing too, and that the EU had better stop doing it.
Allow me to interject a few facts. First, Belgium was created in 1830, so a political difficulty after 177 years is hardly evidence of a flawed political system. Next, the politicians who are pushing hardest for the break-up of Belgium are precisely the ones who have the least love for the EU. Flemish nationalists are at least consistent in their nationalism. Thirdly, a major reason why Belgian politics is not currently serving as a unifying force is the absence of federal political parties. Belgian political parties are in fact regional, aspiring also to play a role at the federal level. The weakness of their federal presence is a problem, not a good thing. (It is no accident that European federalists are arguing for stronger political parties at the European level.)
Lastly, even if Belgium should break up, is that such a disaster? It is not as if Belgium will disappear altogether. The cities of Bruges and Ghent are not going to slip beneath the waves; Holland is not going to acquire a south coast; life will go on, if in smaller political units. C E M Joad in “Why war?” wrote about how smaller political units might actually be better, not worse, because they are less tempted by the illusory glory of military might. Denmark was his example then (in 1939) compared with its immediate southern neighbour. (The crisis in Belgium has been followed closely in Scotland and Catalonia, too, where they are disinterested but not uninterested.)
And, approaching this question from the other direction, if the Eurosceptics are right and any “artificial” political unit is inevitably going to break up, the existence of the European Union makes it possible for that break up to be managed. An EU conceived as a union of states and citizens will better cope with new, smaller member states, than one conceived as a union of states alone.
There are lessons for the EU arising from the current problems in Belgium, but they are the opposite of the lessons that Eurosceptics are hoping to learn.
¤ ¤ ¤
Read the debate on the subject in the Financial Times here, including a typically incisive comment from the excellent Brendan Donnelly.
Posted by Richard Laming at 15:29
1 comments
