The heart of the argument seems to be (we are only half way through, so things might change) that the Romans succeeded where the EU is failing because (1) they stuck to guaranteeing free trade rather than attempting any more extensive regulation and (2) they established the firm idea of citizenship and identity that bound the empire together. The EU goes too far in the first of these and not far enough in the second.
The obvious retort is that to go further in establishing the sense of identity would be to enact precisely the kind of regulation that goes beyond free trade. In some ways, the Roman empire was far more intrusive that the EU might ever be. The economic resources of the empire were taxed quite heavily in order to pay for the city of Rome. There is no comparison here with the EU. The only thing that the two have in common is geography.
I have written elsewhere on this site about my attitude to theories: it is not a question of whether they are right or wrong but of whether they are useful. An attempt to interpret the EU by reference to ancient Rome fails this consideration utterly.
It would be much more interesting to compare the EU with modern-day integration processes that depend on consent. The United States might be one such example, the unification of Italy, perhaps, is another. There will be others, too, that make much better comparisons with the European Union. You would also get the travelogue sections, still, and some interesting experts to get quotes from. All we need is a floppy-haired Europhile to act as presenter. Any suggestions?
Posted by Richard Laming at 20:48
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A fascinating presentation this morning by the Edelman public relations company of their 2006 Trust Barometer. This is a survey of opinion around the world of the extent to which different institutions in society are trusted. The headline figure is that NGOs and business are the most trusted, and government and the media the least. This is broadly true throughout the western world, which sheds new light on the idea that people do not trust the European Union. Maybe the complaint is not that it is supranational but rather that it is government. National governments are hardly trusted, either.
One comment made by the presenter, Richard Edelman, I think I take issue with. He remarked that British attitudes appeared to be moving more similar to the American ones, as opposed to the European ones, based on the basic numbers. The data appears here:
| US | UK | Europe | |
| NGOs | 54 | 56 | 57 |
| Business in general | 49 | 53 | 42 |
| Government in general | 38 | 33 | 33 |
| Media in general | 30 | 22 | 30 |
(Figures are percentages, data from the Edelman Annual Trust Barometer, January 2006)
And maybe in some respects it does. But there is more to "Europe" than meets the eye. It is not a single territory but a collection of different countries, each of which gives different results in this survey. They have a lot in common, but they are different. Here are the European results, by country.
| France | Germany | Italy | Spain | UK | |
| NGOs | 61 | 37 | 66 | 65 | 56 |
| Business in general | 28 | 33 | 51 | 45 | 53 |
| Government in general | 32 | 27 | 39 | 33 | 33 |
| Media in general | 26 | 33 | 31 | 35 | 22 |
(Figures are percentages, data from the Edelman Annual Trust Barometer, January 2006)
The variation between each European country is at least as great as the variation between Europe and America. The US numbers would fit quite happily into the European table. The trust problem, and there certainly is one, is a problem I suppose of capitalist democracy rather than of the European Union as such.
There are some interesting variations that crop up, though. The most striking, highlighted in the presentation this morning, is that when it comes to the national origin of companies, American companies in Europe appear to have a "trust discount" in Europe. Major well-known American names are in general less trusted in Europe than they are at home. There are a few exceptions, such as Microsoft, which make interesting case studies, but there seems to be a European view of American business, rightly or wrongly, which holds against them the fact that they are American. Non-American companies do not face the same hurdle, except it seems for French companies in America.
There is actually a further and important exception to that last rule, which is that Japanese companies are not trusted in China and Chinese companies in Japan. There is a strong rise in nationalist feeling in both countries, and bear in mind that there has not been the same kind of reconciliation between them that has occurred between the former combatants in Europe. Public ill-feeling can undermine business confidence and hurt the trading environment. Politicians who merrily stir up nationalist and xenophobic feeling should not be allowed to do so lightly.
You can find more about Edelman here http://www.edelman.com
Posted by Richard Laming at 17:36
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Jefferson was portrayed as an idealist for the small state, where government takes a low profile in the interests of strong, confident citizenry. Hamilton, on the other hand, advocated strong, central institutions of government at the federal level. Only through effective government and the rule of law, he said, could freedom of the individual be assured.
The intriguing element of the debate was the notion that they were both right and that the American political system expresses elements of both philosophies. There was an argument that was critical of Jefferson in that he did not live up to his own principles. He famously wrote the American Declaration of Independence, which reads “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all mean are created equal”, but he himself owned slaves and did not think that women should have the right to vote. He was the product of, and defender of, a very aristocratic notion of democracy: strong, confident citizens could only be strong and confident if they had the necessary wealth. Democracy was, in effect, only for the rich.
Hamilton, on the other hand, was much more nearly a self-made man. His vision of democracy was more egalitarian but his vision brought with it the need for an active government. Keeping that government in check becomes then a principle task of politics. Perhaps part of what fuelled Jefferson’s idea was the notion that one of the triggers for the American revolution itself was popular resentment of a faraway government that imposed burdens on the citizens. The American political system should not replace what George III had had rejected.
What particularly intrigued me was that, in addition to the two academics who led off the debate, there were contributions, impassioned contributions, from two others, Bonnie Greer (for Jefferson) and John Redwood (for Hamilton). Even better, the discussion strayed into the issue of Europe, but, I suppose because this was intended to be a discussion about America (the two academics were both experts on American political history), the best questions about Europe were not put.
John Redwood, of course, is better known as a prominent Eurosceptic, so it was a rare pleasure to hear him supporting the arguments of a federalist. Specifically, his argument centred on the importance of the rule of law. Margaret Thatcher, he said, would always insist that freedom was not possible without it, and she was right. When it came to Europe, though, he said there was no demos and that therefore democracy was not possible. In America, there was, so it was.
This seems fine, but it doesn’t go far enough. Let’s go back to something Hamilton wrote (in Federalist Paper number 6 published on 14 November 1787 (read it here) and reprinted on the cover page of each issue of The Federalist from Pavia):
“To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.”
Nothing about a demos, there; all about the rule of law. If we want peace in Europe, if states and citizens are to be free, we need an international rule of law. That’s what European integration is seeking to create, although in his writings on Europe, John Redwood seems slow to accept it.
The demos point needs to be dealt with, though, and this is where Jean Monnet’s notion of building Europe by stages comes in. Over time, as the citizens of Europe in their different countries get more and more used to working together, more and more can be done together. At any one time, the state of European integration is a compromise between the desire for more integration and the reluctance to concede it. Often, people search for perfection in political systems – and the politicians responsible for those systems do nothing to discourage them – but actually nothing is perfect.
An important distinction that John Redwood drew between America then and Europe now was that the American states then faced common threats (Britain, France, Spain) which the European countries now do not. I don’t know if he has been following the news about the fears of a Europe-wide gas shortage (a quarter of UK gas comes from the European network), and I don’t think that the British people have some kind of in-built immunity to avian flu, and we certainly aren’t going to escape the effects of climate change in our small, crowded island. These are common threats, and I think that the people and the countries of Europe do indeed need a common Hamiltonian political system in order to face them.
¤ ¤ ¤
The programme will be broadcast again on Saturday 7 January at 10.15 pm on Radio 4 FM. You can read about it here http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/greatdebates/pip/qswjp/ and I’ll post a comment if there is a link where the programme can be heard on the web.
Posted by Richard Laming at 22:46
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It is certainly the case that the Commission has the monopoly on proposing the legislation that makes up the single market, and that it is has the responsibility to promote the common European interest rather than the sectional interest of any member state, but even an arch-Europhile like me wouldn’t say that this is the biggest concentration of power in the country. Tony Blair came 7th in the poll and Gordon Brown 9th, which the latter must hate.
The BBC reports Roger Knapman, UKIP MEP, as saying "Of course it is the only chance you'll get to vote for him or for that matter against him." (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4574968.stm)
He’s not wrong, but that’s not the whole story. There is one person mentioned in that last paragraph who did get to vote for or against Mr Barroso, and that is Roger Knapman himself (according to Article 214(2) of the consolidated treaty, the European Parliament has to approve or reject the choice of president made by the European Council). Let’s go further and ask who got to vote for Tony Blair or Gordon Brown. The voters in Sedgefield and Kirkcaldy & Cowdenbeath, obviously, and the members of the House of Commons who support or oppose the government, but anyone else? Neither was a candidate in the constituency where I live.
The best way to sort this out, though, would be to give Mr Barroso, or rather his successor, a clearer mandate. What if each of the parties that contested the European elections in 2009 each nominated a candidate for president of the Commission? They already draw up Europe-wide manifestos so choosing a candidate should be no problem for them. The voters then could take into account the different candidates when deciding how to vote. We say goodbye forever to the complaint that the Commission president is unelected, and a good thing too.
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Posted by Richard Laming at 17:31
4 comments
There have been proposals to improve the way that the EU goes about its energy policy. Article III-256 of the constitutional treaty would have done this, but of course this remains in suspended animation for the time being.
There were British critics of the constitutional treaty who were afraid of this article because, they feared, it would give the EU control of Britain’s North Sea oil. Not so, of course, it wouldn’t have done that.
What’s more, Britain’s fabled North Sea oil is running out. We are joining the rest of the EU as a net importer of energy, with the same interests as them in ensuring a secure supply at reasonable prices. (Remember this, the next time that someone says to you that Britain should try to emulate Norway as a non-member of the EU.) A collective EU policy as regards purchasing gas would be better for all of us than allowing ourselves to be drawn into an auction, bidding against each other. As an example of the common European interest, this is a very good one.
And actually, this is how supranationalism in Europe started. It wasn’t to make peace, it was to win war. Jean Monnet tells the story in his Memoirs.
For the first two years of the first world war, the different Allied countries – Britain, France and Italy – had been bidding against each other for supplies of wheat from Canada, Argentina and the United States, sometimes pushing up the prices which they all had to pay. Slowly, arrangements were introduced whereby information was exchanged between the different national purchasing operations to try and bring some kind of order to the system. It worked, but not very well, until on 29 November 1916 a fully-fledged joint operation was established. This coordinated the acquisition and shipping of wheat, despatching it to wherever it was needed most.
In one sense, this was a substantial step forward. Each combatant power was willing to give up exclusive control of a part of its war effort in the common interests of the alliance as a whole (the same step was not taken with the armed forces, by the way). In another sense, this was merely the expression of the notion that a defeat for France would inevitably lead to defeat for Britain and that, therefore, keeping France in the war was an integral part of the British war effort. It should have been obvious.
The same principle was adopted at the start of the second world war, too, to acquire food, raw materials and above all aeroplanes. The Anglo-French Coordinating Committee was chaired by Monnet (“the first federal official of the New World”) and set up a Purchasing Board in Washington DC to maximise the buying power of the western European allies in the face of the Nazi threat.
Supranational institutions turn out to be the best way to protect a common interest, when the different national policies might actually serve to undermine each other. We Europeans are going to get a much better deal from the Russians over gas, or anything else, if we stick together.
Posted by Richard Laming at 14:25
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