15 August 2008
Should Georgia join Nato?
The recent war in Georgia has shocked and frightened all of Europe. Thankfully, it is coming to a halt, but whether that halt will prove temporary or permanent is beyond the judgement of this blog (and indeed any blog).
Some thoughts about what caused the war, though, are worth airing. The fighting started when the Georgian government attempted to reassert control over the breakaway province of South Ossetia, which required an attack on the Russian forces that were stationed there (nominally as peacekeepers, but in fact as the advance guard of an occupation). The Russians then responded with overwhelming force, not entirely unlike a full-scale military invasion.
The argument that Georgian membership of Nato would have prevented the war seems to me a little odd. Would the Russians have been dissuaded from their reaction if Georgia had been a member of Nato? I doubt it. Those Nato members that are most sympathetic to the Georgian case have no troops to send (or no troops to spare, as they are already in Afghanistan and Iraq), while those countries that do have soldiers available (because they’ve not been sent to Afghanistan) would be even less likely to want to the fight the Russians. On the other hand, a Georgian government that believed it had the military protection of America and Europe would have been no less likely to have embarked on its doomed military mission in the first place.
Nato members would then have been faced with a terrible dilemma. Either fight the Russians, or allow the mutual defence commitment that is central to the Nato alliance to evaporate into thin air. Anyone who says that Georgia should have been admitted to Nato membership at the summit in Bucharest in April 2008 has got to say which of those two they would prefer.
The fundamental problem is that Nato does not add to its mutual defence guarantee any meaningful way of making common policies. During the Cold War, this did not matter: the threat was obviously from the Soviet Union and America was obviously the leader of the free world. The United States could therefore make decisions on behalf of the entire alliance, although there was controversy even over some of those, such as the decision to deploy Tomahawk and Pershing missiles in the early 1980s.
Now that the threat and the leadership role are not quite so clear, what can be done? There would have been no question of a Nato member during the Cold War embarking on the kind of adventure that Georgia has just done: the Americans would not have allowed it. The assumption that Georgian membership of Nato would have led it to follow wider Nato policies is surely wrong. More likely, Nato membership would have emboldened Georgia to continue with its existing policy, in the belief that it had the support of the rest of the west. As the Georgians have found out to their cost, they don’t.
The European Union is more realistic that Nato in this regard, recognising that joint policy-making has got to accompany mutual obligations. Of course, joint policy-making is hard, which why the EU has a relatively limited competence in foreign affairs and security at present. But the EU is more likely to prove a useful vehicle for cooperation in these areas in future precisely because it has a better way of taking decisions.
Some thoughts about what caused the war, though, are worth airing. The fighting started when the Georgian government attempted to reassert control over the breakaway province of South Ossetia, which required an attack on the Russian forces that were stationed there (nominally as peacekeepers, but in fact as the advance guard of an occupation). The Russians then responded with overwhelming force, not entirely unlike a full-scale military invasion.
The argument that Georgian membership of Nato would have prevented the war seems to me a little odd. Would the Russians have been dissuaded from their reaction if Georgia had been a member of Nato? I doubt it. Those Nato members that are most sympathetic to the Georgian case have no troops to send (or no troops to spare, as they are already in Afghanistan and Iraq), while those countries that do have soldiers available (because they’ve not been sent to Afghanistan) would be even less likely to want to the fight the Russians. On the other hand, a Georgian government that believed it had the military protection of America and Europe would have been no less likely to have embarked on its doomed military mission in the first place.
Nato members would then have been faced with a terrible dilemma. Either fight the Russians, or allow the mutual defence commitment that is central to the Nato alliance to evaporate into thin air. Anyone who says that Georgia should have been admitted to Nato membership at the summit in Bucharest in April 2008 has got to say which of those two they would prefer.
The fundamental problem is that Nato does not add to its mutual defence guarantee any meaningful way of making common policies. During the Cold War, this did not matter: the threat was obviously from the Soviet Union and America was obviously the leader of the free world. The United States could therefore make decisions on behalf of the entire alliance, although there was controversy even over some of those, such as the decision to deploy Tomahawk and Pershing missiles in the early 1980s.
Now that the threat and the leadership role are not quite so clear, what can be done? There would have been no question of a Nato member during the Cold War embarking on the kind of adventure that Georgia has just done: the Americans would not have allowed it. The assumption that Georgian membership of Nato would have led it to follow wider Nato policies is surely wrong. More likely, Nato membership would have emboldened Georgia to continue with its existing policy, in the belief that it had the support of the rest of the west. As the Georgians have found out to their cost, they don’t.
The European Union is more realistic that Nato in this regard, recognising that joint policy-making has got to accompany mutual obligations. Of course, joint policy-making is hard, which why the EU has a relatively limited competence in foreign affairs and security at present. But the EU is more likely to prove a useful vehicle for cooperation in these areas in future precisely because it has a better way of taking decisions.
Posted by Richard Laming at 17:15
This post has been removed by the author.
While we should NOT point fingers of blame, we should understand the Georgia started this conflict when Saakashvili set troops into South Ossetia. Russian peacekeepers were killed and Russia did what could be expected, even required.
Also, Saakashvili is portrayed as some kind of "freedom loving democrat" that respects European/Western values, but he's past record indicates that he has trouble with especially freedom of speech. That said, Saakashvili appears to not be responsible and this conflict, started by his actions, clearly demonstrates that.
NO - Georgia not only does not belong in NATO, but we should be thanking the French especially for objecting to Georgia's membership! There are NO security guarantees for NATO PfP members.
Also - I am a believer that NATO has no purpose anymore other than force ESDP to be under NATO and to keep Americans in Europe. The sounds from the American government clearly indicate that the Americans are clearly on the side of Georgia. This conflict, although a result of a bad decision by Saakashvili, shows that the struggle to maintain the old Atlanticist US/NATO order in Europe is dangerous to world peace, as well as European peace.
Yes, this is the hour of Europe. And- any solution SHOULD NOT seek sanctions or punitive measures against Russia, but the European Union should use this as an opportunity to draw closer to Russia, as well as Georgia and South Ossetia (which should be independent of Georgia, if it wished). The hour of Europe should be used in a positive and productive fashion - and avoid the temptation to recreate Cold War divisions!
Surely, the NATO Charter is meant to protect members from unprovoked attack, but the Georgian leadership played into Putin's hands.
But Russian troops ('peacekeepers') would be incongruous on the soil of a NATO member, strengthening the cause for a political solution to these thorny crises.
There are enough internal vetoes in place against NATO and EU expansion, without giving Russia cause to believe that it is entitled to dictate accession from the outside.
Richard, you provide a false dichotomy: it is not a case of those—such as myself—who advocated Georgian MAP status at Bucharest having to accept that we would have either gone to war with Russia or accepted the destruction of the alliance (i.e. through failing to invoke Article 5). The point of NATO is to DETER foreign powers against attacking NATO members. Unless Putin is suicidal, there is absolutely no way he would have invaded Georgia, had the country been in NATO. He would be risking a rain of ruin falling from the air, reducing the Russian population to zero.
As for decision making: ultimately, this should rest with those countries willing to make the sacrifice to defend the democratic world with thermonuclear weapons. All the other non-nuclear NATO powers are irrelevant, and with declining defence budgets, increasingly so. All of them depend on the ballistic missiles kept in British, American and French nuclear submarines, ready to be fired in their defence.
Without those thermonuclear missiles, both NATO and the European Union are defenceless—and therefore meaningless.
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova need to be brought into the Atlantic Alliance without delay. And the EU needs to send peace enforcement troops to end the frozen conflicts on their territories—particularly in Transnistria, before the Russians decide they need to protect Russian passport holders there...
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