15 June 2008
Oh shit (again)
We have been here before. Here is what I wrote after the No vote in France three years ago: http://www.federalunion.org.uk/blog/yesblog/2005_05.shtml. Much of the same applies now after the Irish No vote.
Some facts first of all. The vote in Ireland was 752,451 votes in favour of the Lisbon Treaty, and 862,415 against. With a turnout of 53.1 per cent, the percentage split was 46.6 per cent in favour, 53.4 per cent against. Or put another way, the votes of less than a million Europeans are sufficient to derail a treaty that was agreed by governments representing 500 million Europeans.
And now that the treaty is derailed, can it be put back again? I think there are three possible ways forward.
1. A new vote in Ireland
As after the Irish voted No to the Nice treaty in a referendum, there could be a second ballot in a year’s time after all the other member states have ratified. That was, the prospect of holding up the whole European Union might be sufficient to persuade enough Irish voters to change their minds. The immediate problem with this strategy is that it was already clear to the Irish voters what the consequences for the EU would be of a No vote on the Lisbon treaty and they voted that way regardless.
At the time of Nice, the rerun was put forward as a way of helping the eastern Europeans who at that time were still due to join. These days, those same eastern Europeans have been working in Ireland on building sites and behind bars: the Irish voters can’t be put under the same pressure as before. A second, and bigger, problem with such a rerun is that it rather defeats the purpose of holding a referendum in the first place. Either the people decide or they do not. The problem is that no serious thought has been given to what to do in the event of a No vote, and restaging any referendum that produces such a result is no solution. Worse, it undermines the credibility of referendums elsewhere in Europe later on.
2. The Lisbon treaty without Ireland
Fourteen member states have ratified the Lisbon treaty so far, and the other twelve are committed to doing so by parliamentary means. There is a lot of political support remaining behind the treaty: so much effort was put into negotiating it that one can see why its supporters do not want to give up now. Those politicians who have declared that the Irish vote has killed the treaty in the whole of Europe, such as Tory shadow foreign secretary William Hague and Czech president Vaclav Klaus, were opponents of the treaty in the first place and so are hardly independent authorities on the subject.
But the problem for the continuing supporters of the treaty is that there is no obvious means of implementing the treaty without Ireland. Those parts of the treaty that might readily be opted out of, such as Schengen and defence cooperation, already permit the Irish to stand aside, so there is not much that could be done to its substance. The position would be very different were Ireland to withdraw from the EU altogether, but there seems to be little appetite in Ireland for that.
3. Salvaging parts of the Lisbon treaty
Quite a lot of the treaty could probably be agreed and implemented in other ways. It is at heart an intergovernmental agreement and could be replaced by other, less far-reaching intergovernmental agreements covering those areas where governments cooperate together. The supranational elements of the EU – the Commission, the Parliament – would be harder to change in this way, although the accession treaty that will shortly be negotiated with Croatia might permit the number of MEPs to be reduced, for example.
This approach has the merit of enabling the uncontroversial parts of the treaty to be adopted in an uncontroversial manner. It has two drawbacks, though. First, it can only deal with the uncontroversial parts of the treaty, but a number of the most important reforms were controversial. The reduction in the size of the European Commission, for example, was a big issue in Ireland. Secondly, the reforms it might introduce might relate to the relationship between the EU and the member states, and that between the member states themselves, but not to the relationship between the EU and its citizens. In many eyes, including those of this blog, that third relationship is the most important, and it will be deeply unsatisfactory to leave it unimproved. Opponents of the EU will pick on this problem and use it as an argument that even those parts of the Lisbon treaty that can be saved should not be, and that the fact that they are is further evidence of the gulf between the EU and the voters.
Of these three options, all are unsatisfactory but the third is the least unsatisfactory of the three. After the French and Dutch No votes, I recommended a comprehensive rethink of the constitutional treaty: I don’t think that there is scope for that now. Better to get something done, rather than nothing. Given the overall balance of opinion in the EU – a majority of member states have already ratified, don’t forget – it is perfectly legitimate to find a way to do this. But it is also necessary to learn the lessons from this episode, lessons that we can discuss on this blog in the future.
Some facts first of all. The vote in Ireland was 752,451 votes in favour of the Lisbon Treaty, and 862,415 against. With a turnout of 53.1 per cent, the percentage split was 46.6 per cent in favour, 53.4 per cent against. Or put another way, the votes of less than a million Europeans are sufficient to derail a treaty that was agreed by governments representing 500 million Europeans.
And now that the treaty is derailed, can it be put back again? I think there are three possible ways forward.
1. A new vote in Ireland
As after the Irish voted No to the Nice treaty in a referendum, there could be a second ballot in a year’s time after all the other member states have ratified. That was, the prospect of holding up the whole European Union might be sufficient to persuade enough Irish voters to change their minds. The immediate problem with this strategy is that it was already clear to the Irish voters what the consequences for the EU would be of a No vote on the Lisbon treaty and they voted that way regardless.
At the time of Nice, the rerun was put forward as a way of helping the eastern Europeans who at that time were still due to join. These days, those same eastern Europeans have been working in Ireland on building sites and behind bars: the Irish voters can’t be put under the same pressure as before. A second, and bigger, problem with such a rerun is that it rather defeats the purpose of holding a referendum in the first place. Either the people decide or they do not. The problem is that no serious thought has been given to what to do in the event of a No vote, and restaging any referendum that produces such a result is no solution. Worse, it undermines the credibility of referendums elsewhere in Europe later on.
2. The Lisbon treaty without Ireland
Fourteen member states have ratified the Lisbon treaty so far, and the other twelve are committed to doing so by parliamentary means. There is a lot of political support remaining behind the treaty: so much effort was put into negotiating it that one can see why its supporters do not want to give up now. Those politicians who have declared that the Irish vote has killed the treaty in the whole of Europe, such as Tory shadow foreign secretary William Hague and Czech president Vaclav Klaus, were opponents of the treaty in the first place and so are hardly independent authorities on the subject.
But the problem for the continuing supporters of the treaty is that there is no obvious means of implementing the treaty without Ireland. Those parts of the treaty that might readily be opted out of, such as Schengen and defence cooperation, already permit the Irish to stand aside, so there is not much that could be done to its substance. The position would be very different were Ireland to withdraw from the EU altogether, but there seems to be little appetite in Ireland for that.
3. Salvaging parts of the Lisbon treaty
Quite a lot of the treaty could probably be agreed and implemented in other ways. It is at heart an intergovernmental agreement and could be replaced by other, less far-reaching intergovernmental agreements covering those areas where governments cooperate together. The supranational elements of the EU – the Commission, the Parliament – would be harder to change in this way, although the accession treaty that will shortly be negotiated with Croatia might permit the number of MEPs to be reduced, for example.
This approach has the merit of enabling the uncontroversial parts of the treaty to be adopted in an uncontroversial manner. It has two drawbacks, though. First, it can only deal with the uncontroversial parts of the treaty, but a number of the most important reforms were controversial. The reduction in the size of the European Commission, for example, was a big issue in Ireland. Secondly, the reforms it might introduce might relate to the relationship between the EU and the member states, and that between the member states themselves, but not to the relationship between the EU and its citizens. In many eyes, including those of this blog, that third relationship is the most important, and it will be deeply unsatisfactory to leave it unimproved. Opponents of the EU will pick on this problem and use it as an argument that even those parts of the Lisbon treaty that can be saved should not be, and that the fact that they are is further evidence of the gulf between the EU and the voters.
Of these three options, all are unsatisfactory but the third is the least unsatisfactory of the three. After the French and Dutch No votes, I recommended a comprehensive rethink of the constitutional treaty: I don’t think that there is scope for that now. Better to get something done, rather than nothing. Given the overall balance of opinion in the EU – a majority of member states have already ratified, don’t forget – it is perfectly legitimate to find a way to do this. But it is also necessary to learn the lessons from this episode, lessons that we can discuss on this blog in the future.
Posted by Richard Laming at 19:46
Two thirds of the member states (18) have completed the essentials of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.
After the Irish 'no', we know that there will be two groups of states: ratifiers and non-ratifiers.
France and Germany have, after the outcome in Ireland became clear, expressed that the Treaty of Lisbon is necessary to make the European Union more democratic and effective.
The following question is how many of the present member states will rally to the Franco-German call, in spite of less than 27 ratifications.
Formally, the Lisbon Treaty requires every member state's ratification to enter into force.
Since this is not going to happen, the question is, in these changed circumstances, what is needed to put the substance of the treaty into effect between the ratifying states.
This might require the establishment of a new European Union and certainly a number of technical modifications to the Lisbon Treaty.
The size of the non-ratifying group will be interesting to follow, with contradictory signals from the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom.
Dear Richard, Thanks for your article which is very thought-provoking.
However, may I raise a small question? You have written:
the votes of less than a million Europeans are sufficient to derail a treaty that was agreed by governments representing 500 million Europeans.
umm ... by governments representing 500 million Europeans.
There seems to be a dissonance here. The devil perhaps lies in the word "represents". Surely, if the government of Ireland was really representing the interests of the people of Ireland, then the government of Ireland would have never signed the Treaty. In voting NO, the people of Ireland were presumably expressing the view: "we do not think that this Treaty is in our interests." The NO vote expresses the will of the people.
Does it not then follow that if the government of Ireland was really representing the interests and the will of the people of Ireland, then the government should never have signed the Treaty.
John McClintock
Brussels.
John McClintock,
An even smaller distinction: The 500 million Europeans are represented by 27 signing member states' governments and, by now, 19 national parliaments, in most cases with overwhelming votes in favour of ratification.
For those who believe in representative democracy the pro count is almost devstatingly high.
Dear Richard,
I apologize for my ignorance, but I do not understand why the countries which ratified this treaty cannot go forward without Ireland. I mean in any treaty made inside the EU we had so many opt-outs that it wouldn't change anything if we just ignore Ireland. Think of the other countries which are BEGGING to be part of our Union...
Christian Nittis
Even if the rest of the EU ratifies the Lisbon treaty, I doubt whether that will so impress the Irish electorate that it would persuade enough of them to change their minds to secure a majority for ratification in a second referendum on the same treaty (and if the treaty itself is changed, all 27 member states will have to start the process all over again, not an attractive prospect). The Irish would doubtless say, probably correctly, that since not a single other EU member state held a referendum before ratifying it, there's no evidence that the people of the Eu are in favour of the treaty: if other countries had risked holding referendums, it seems highly likely that it would have been rejected in several of them, almost certainly including the UK.
Brian
http://www.barder.com/ephems/
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