28 November 2007
Who wants to be a superpower?
The discussion following foreign secretary David Miliband’s speech in Bruges on 15 November was all about the prime minister’s intervention in the text. In case you missed it, the version actually delivered on the day was different in a number of respects from the version circulated in advance to the media, with the differences attributed to Gordon Brown. In a government of all the talents, he is clearly a man of all the talents, those talents extending as far as proofreading.
The tone of the changes was to reduce the overall vision for Europe in the speech – which you can read here – but if we are honest, nobody is really looking to the UK for leadership in Europe right now so to that extent the row about the editing is largely a fuss about nothing.
However, even in the edited version, there are some interesting things to note. It is a pity that they were overshadowed by the debate about the prime minister’s intervention, because actually they contain the kernel of a good idea.
The central thrust of the speech, indeed the title of the speech, was “model power not superpower”. Europe could be a model power by:
(1) being “open - open to trade, open to ideas and open to investment”
(2) using “the power of shared institutions and shared activities to help overcome religious, regional, and cultural divides, especially with the Islamic world”
(3) “should champion international law and human rights not just internally, but externally too”
(4) becoming “a low carbon power ... an Environmental Union”
Apparently the foreign secretary also wanted to say some things about European military cooperation but these were toned down.
But the four points that survived are fine. They represent, if I can use this phrase, the progressive consensus, but everything rests on their implementation, not their enunciation. This is where the second part of David Miliband’s theme comes in: the refusal to become a superpower.
David Miliband defined the term by saying:
“An American academic has defined a superpower as 'a country that has the capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world… and so may plausibly attain the status of global hegemon'.”
(You can find that definition on Wikipedia, which is probably where David Miliband’s speech writer found it. That academic, by the way, was Lyman Miller, who is noted for expertise on China rather than on international relations as such, which might explain her anonymity in the speech.)
And he adds that:
“The EU is not and never will be a superpower. An EU of 27 nation states or more is never going to have the fleetness of foot or the fiscal base to dominate.”
I welcome that. It is a vision of Europe of a certain kind, being acceptable to Gordon Brown in that it implicitly rejects the idea of rivalry with America, but I welcome it for a different reason. I don’t think it’s a good idea for any country to take on the mantle of being a superpower, not even America. This isn’t being anti-American, but being anti-superpower.
The problem with being a superpower is precisely that capacity to project dominating power anywhere in the world. Whenever any issue arises, there is the possibility to get involved and therefore the hope, from one side or another, that you will. Whatever the issue, someone is going to try to drag the Americans in if they think that the Americans will be on their side.
And that is not only bad for the superpower, it is also bad for the issues. Third countries will base their own assessments of issues partly on what they mean for their relations with the superpower rather than on the merits of the issue as such. Think of the war in Iraq: countries such as the UK, Poland and Italy all supported the war because of their relationship with America, rather than specifically because of concerns about Iraq. Silvio Berlusconi, than Italian prime minister admitted this openly; Tony Blair was less clear but this was still his main reason for joining the war.
And you can add to all that the sheer cost of being a superpower, a cost that even the Americans can no longer afford to pay. It is a genuine question whether even the Americans can actually project “dominating power and influence” throughout the world any more. They don’t seem able to control impose their will on Iraq, still less on Iran. Maybe the era of all superpowers is passed.
Hubert Védrine, the then French foreign minister, described the United States as not only a superpower but even a “hyperpower” in a speech back in 1999. The neo-cons in Washington shared that view, but the passage of events has shown it to be false. It is one thing to pretend to be all-powerful, it is another thing actually to be all-powerful, and the moment of discovery can bring a nasty shock.
David Miliband is right to reject the dream of aspiring to superpower status. Maybe there is a lesson for Gordon Brown here, too.
The tone of the changes was to reduce the overall vision for Europe in the speech – which you can read here – but if we are honest, nobody is really looking to the UK for leadership in Europe right now so to that extent the row about the editing is largely a fuss about nothing.
However, even in the edited version, there are some interesting things to note. It is a pity that they were overshadowed by the debate about the prime minister’s intervention, because actually they contain the kernel of a good idea.
The central thrust of the speech, indeed the title of the speech, was “model power not superpower”. Europe could be a model power by:
(1) being “open - open to trade, open to ideas and open to investment”
(2) using “the power of shared institutions and shared activities to help overcome religious, regional, and cultural divides, especially with the Islamic world”
(3) “should champion international law and human rights not just internally, but externally too”
(4) becoming “a low carbon power ... an Environmental Union”
Apparently the foreign secretary also wanted to say some things about European military cooperation but these were toned down.
But the four points that survived are fine. They represent, if I can use this phrase, the progressive consensus, but everything rests on their implementation, not their enunciation. This is where the second part of David Miliband’s theme comes in: the refusal to become a superpower.
David Miliband defined the term by saying:
“An American academic has defined a superpower as 'a country that has the capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world… and so may plausibly attain the status of global hegemon'.”
(You can find that definition on Wikipedia, which is probably where David Miliband’s speech writer found it. That academic, by the way, was Lyman Miller, who is noted for expertise on China rather than on international relations as such, which might explain her anonymity in the speech.)
And he adds that:
“The EU is not and never will be a superpower. An EU of 27 nation states or more is never going to have the fleetness of foot or the fiscal base to dominate.”
I welcome that. It is a vision of Europe of a certain kind, being acceptable to Gordon Brown in that it implicitly rejects the idea of rivalry with America, but I welcome it for a different reason. I don’t think it’s a good idea for any country to take on the mantle of being a superpower, not even America. This isn’t being anti-American, but being anti-superpower.
The problem with being a superpower is precisely that capacity to project dominating power anywhere in the world. Whenever any issue arises, there is the possibility to get involved and therefore the hope, from one side or another, that you will. Whatever the issue, someone is going to try to drag the Americans in if they think that the Americans will be on their side.
And that is not only bad for the superpower, it is also bad for the issues. Third countries will base their own assessments of issues partly on what they mean for their relations with the superpower rather than on the merits of the issue as such. Think of the war in Iraq: countries such as the UK, Poland and Italy all supported the war because of their relationship with America, rather than specifically because of concerns about Iraq. Silvio Berlusconi, than Italian prime minister admitted this openly; Tony Blair was less clear but this was still his main reason for joining the war.
And you can add to all that the sheer cost of being a superpower, a cost that even the Americans can no longer afford to pay. It is a genuine question whether even the Americans can actually project “dominating power and influence” throughout the world any more. They don’t seem able to control impose their will on Iraq, still less on Iran. Maybe the era of all superpowers is passed.
Hubert Védrine, the then French foreign minister, described the United States as not only a superpower but even a “hyperpower” in a speech back in 1999. The neo-cons in Washington shared that view, but the passage of events has shown it to be false. It is one thing to pretend to be all-powerful, it is another thing actually to be all-powerful, and the moment of discovery can bring a nasty shock.
David Miliband is right to reject the dream of aspiring to superpower status. Maybe there is a lesson for Gordon Brown here, too.
Posted by Richard Laming at 18:00
The trouble with your analysis, Richard, is that you fall into the trap of accepting Miliband and Miller's definition of 'superpower'. Perhaps if we went back to the definition of the term provided by Dr. William Fox, who actually coined the term in his 1944 study, we might find that the concept of 'superpower' is not just about power and dominance.
Rather, Fox's argument was that world peace was dependent on the ability of a few key powers upholding world order—these powers being the United Kingdom, United States and Soviet Russia (in 1944). A superpower was not just a monumentally powerful political community, but also one which was willing to stand up and be counted in assuming its special duties and obligations in the wider world. The old dictum 'With great power comes great responsibility', comes to mind.
Indeed, Fox rebuked 1940s Americans—similarly as many Americans do to Europeans today—for their naive idealism: 'It is a peculiarly American notion to assume that problems in a world of power politics can be solved by creating a world of no-power politics.'
Idealism and the intervention of Miliband aside, the European Union, if it is to survive, cannot become anything other than a superpower. It already has an enormous aggregation of power—political, economic, cultural—as well as worldwide reach. And its Member States between them are potent militarily. Britain and France are the second and third biggest defence spenders after the United States, and they are the only other countries other than the latter to have expeditionary naval power.
The Wars of the Yugoslav Succession showed Europeans what happens when they have the power but not the political will or ambition to be a superpower. They sat idly by while murder and mayhem broke out on their borders. If this is characterisitic of a 'civilian power', 'normative power' or 'model power', Europeans should be ashamed.
Indeed, Fox in his 1944 study had this to say about countries that issue worthless statements of condemnation about the wrongdoing of foreigners: 'diplomatic declarations which are highly general in denouncing aggression and highly specific in promising not to implement the declaration in any way [are tantamount to appeasement]'. European action towards the former Yugoslavia falls into this category, as it does similarly to Iran, Sudan and Zimbabwe today.
If the European Union is to count for anything, it needs the ability to hold its own against all opponents and potential rivals. It needs the ability to enforce civilised behaviour on wild and truculent regimes. And it needs to use its power like a superpower in the Foxian sense: to uphold peace and prosperity across the globe. So you and Miliband are mistaken: a superpower Europe is not only necessary but desirable.
This is a difficult circle to square.
On the one hand I concur with Richard's assertion that merely holding the aspiration of "superpower" status can have dangerously unintended consequences but I can also perceive the logic within the argument advanced by james.
I know it might sound rather simple and obvious but perhaps the key to solving this particular conundrum lies in politicisation of the European arena?
The increasingly complex and hybridised structures of governance Europeans have inherited, due primarily to the EU's inherently intergovernmental foundations, are becoming increasingly untenable and unworkable as each crisis and subsequent fudge unfolds.
The time approaches when individual national electorates will be forced to choose between a future either inside or outside an integrating Europe.
Maybe the British electorate requires the shock and awe of a decade sitting on the periphery to understand why beloging to the club was a good idea after all?
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