03 July 2009
Odd position for a Eurosceptic
Further to the previous blog entry about the calls for a general election, I find this further example, from the House of Commons on 16 June:
Mr. Nigel Evans (Ribble Valley) (Con): Following the crushing defeats experienced by the Government on 7 June, when the results of the European elections placed Labour even below the United Kingdom Independence party, what moral authority do they consider that they have to discuss any issue on behalf of the people of this country?
The answer of course is that the government won the general election in 2005. Is Nigel Evans really suggesting that European elections should take over from general elections in deciding who should be in the government of this country? That really would be an odd position to take, even for a Eurosceptic.
Mr. Nigel Evans (Ribble Valley) (Con): Following the crushing defeats experienced by the Government on 7 June, when the results of the European elections placed Labour even below the United Kingdom Independence party, what moral authority do they consider that they have to discuss any issue on behalf of the people of this country?
The answer of course is that the government won the general election in 2005. Is Nigel Evans really suggesting that European elections should take over from general elections in deciding who should be in the government of this country? That really would be an odd position to take, even for a Eurosceptic.
Posted by Richard Laming at 16:49
0 comments
The fate of declining communities
01 July 2009
Jonathan Guthrie writes in the Financial Times about the problems faced by towns and cities once the economic reason for their prosperity goes into decline. Cities in the north of England, for example, once were ideal locations for heavy manufacturing industry but have now lost out to much lower wage competition in China. What happens to those cities now?
For federalists, the answer is probably a combination of action at national or European level to provide funds and know-how to support regeneration and action at regional or local level actually to regenerate. Experience shows that the health of a community, whether economic or otherwise, comes from the bottom and not from the top. An influx of money can help make things better, but it cannot does so on its own. Countries with an effective level of regional government are better placed to deal with economic change.
But how far can this process go? Can economic evolution be resisted forever?
Jonathan Guthrie writes rather brutally that “Any human settlement is ultimately only a location whose utility changes over time.” Traditional nationalism might have something to say about that.
Communities invest their land with a strange magic. How many folksongs and national anthems sing the praises of a territory? Nineteenth century painters expressed their national identity by painting landscapes of their local countryside rather than classical allegories set in made-up Mediterranean settings. And much of the continental resentment about British views of the CAP comes from people who have seen the East Anglian prairies and do not want to see the vistas of Tuscany or the Dordogne go the same way.
Think of the role that rivers, mountain ranges and islands play in shaping political communities and cultures. An investor siting a factory might think in terms of locations, but politics and human identity demand more than that.
That is not to say though that economic forces can be resisted, merely that the political determination to resist them is strong and understandable. Let’s put Jonathan Guthrie’s words into the mouth of a politician: “The United Kingdom is ultimately only a location whose utility changes over time.” Who, other than Alex Salmond perhaps, could say that?
For federalists, the answer is probably a combination of action at national or European level to provide funds and know-how to support regeneration and action at regional or local level actually to regenerate. Experience shows that the health of a community, whether economic or otherwise, comes from the bottom and not from the top. An influx of money can help make things better, but it cannot does so on its own. Countries with an effective level of regional government are better placed to deal with economic change.
But how far can this process go? Can economic evolution be resisted forever?
Jonathan Guthrie writes rather brutally that “Any human settlement is ultimately only a location whose utility changes over time.” Traditional nationalism might have something to say about that.
Communities invest their land with a strange magic. How many folksongs and national anthems sing the praises of a territory? Nineteenth century painters expressed their national identity by painting landscapes of their local countryside rather than classical allegories set in made-up Mediterranean settings. And much of the continental resentment about British views of the CAP comes from people who have seen the East Anglian prairies and do not want to see the vistas of Tuscany or the Dordogne go the same way.
Think of the role that rivers, mountain ranges and islands play in shaping political communities and cultures. An investor siting a factory might think in terms of locations, but politics and human identity demand more than that.
That is not to say though that economic forces can be resisted, merely that the political determination to resist them is strong and understandable. Let’s put Jonathan Guthrie’s words into the mouth of a politician: “The United Kingdom is ultimately only a location whose utility changes over time.” Who, other than Alex Salmond perhaps, could say that?
Posted by Richard Laming at 11:53
0 comments
Home truths about abroad
30 June 2009
The judgment by the German constitutional court approving of the Lisbon treaty has been broadly welcomed by pro-Europeans in Germany. (See a commentary by Hans-Jürgen Schlamp on Speigel Online here.)
One exception to this general rule, though, is that there has been some concern expressed about what was said by the court about the European Parliament. The German section of the European Movement, for example, thinks that its criticism is too harsh:
“Unless EM Germany is in favour that the national parliament is forced to take more commitment and responsibility in European Policy this should not lead to a weakening of the European Parliament.”
What the court said was that the EP is not able to replace national parliaments in filling the democratic deficit in the EU. (Read what the court said here.) It suggested that:
“The further development of the competences of the European Parliament can reduce, but not completely fill, the gap between the extent of the decision-making power of the Union’s institutions and the citizens’ democratic power of action in the Member States.”
I don’t think this is too harsh: it is a statement of fact. The EU is not a unitary political system but a federal one, in which the member states’ governments play a major role at European level. Those member state governments are accountable not to the European Parliament but to national parliaments, so the latter cannot be completely written out of the picture in favour of the former.
Furthermore:
“Neither as regards its composition nor its position in the European competence structure is the European Parliament sufficiently prepared to take representative and assignable majority decisions as uniform decisions on political direction. Measured against requirements placed on democracy in states, its election does not take due account of equality, and it is not competent to take authoritative decisions on political direction in the context of the supranational balancing of interest between the states.”
This notion of equality is important, particularly in Germany. A Maltese MEP represents 80,000 voters (5 MEPs for a population of 400,000) while a German MEP represents 10 times as many (99 MEPs representing 82 million people). This is something German federalists have raised themselves as a matter of unfairness: I am not sure how much I agree with them but they should not forget their own arguments now.
Where I disagree with the court is the statement that:
“It [the EP] therefore cannot support a parliamentary government and organise itself with regard to party politics in the system of government and opposition in such a way that a decision on political direction taken by the European electorate could have a politically decisive effect.”
It has not supported a parliamentary government in the past and does not look like doing so in the coming parliamentary term (although read my call that it should do exactly that on Euobserver yesterday), but that does not mean that it cannot. If European political parties were to organise in a manner recognisable at national level, the model of democracy described by the constitutional court could come about. At that point, and it is perhaps not so far away, the nature of European democracy and the European Union would change very much.
It will be interesting to see if the German politicians who object to the court’s interpretation of the role of the European Parliament will do anything to change it. German MEPs are more numerous than those of any other country, and one of them is leader of the Socialists, so they could, if they wished, bring to the EP a lot of what the court has said it is missing.
One exception to this general rule, though, is that there has been some concern expressed about what was said by the court about the European Parliament. The German section of the European Movement, for example, thinks that its criticism is too harsh:
“Unless EM Germany is in favour that the national parliament is forced to take more commitment and responsibility in European Policy this should not lead to a weakening of the European Parliament.”
What the court said was that the EP is not able to replace national parliaments in filling the democratic deficit in the EU. (Read what the court said here.) It suggested that:
“The further development of the competences of the European Parliament can reduce, but not completely fill, the gap between the extent of the decision-making power of the Union’s institutions and the citizens’ democratic power of action in the Member States.”
I don’t think this is too harsh: it is a statement of fact. The EU is not a unitary political system but a federal one, in which the member states’ governments play a major role at European level. Those member state governments are accountable not to the European Parliament but to national parliaments, so the latter cannot be completely written out of the picture in favour of the former.
Furthermore:
“Neither as regards its composition nor its position in the European competence structure is the European Parliament sufficiently prepared to take representative and assignable majority decisions as uniform decisions on political direction. Measured against requirements placed on democracy in states, its election does not take due account of equality, and it is not competent to take authoritative decisions on political direction in the context of the supranational balancing of interest between the states.”
This notion of equality is important, particularly in Germany. A Maltese MEP represents 80,000 voters (5 MEPs for a population of 400,000) while a German MEP represents 10 times as many (99 MEPs representing 82 million people). This is something German federalists have raised themselves as a matter of unfairness: I am not sure how much I agree with them but they should not forget their own arguments now.
Where I disagree with the court is the statement that:
“It [the EP] therefore cannot support a parliamentary government and organise itself with regard to party politics in the system of government and opposition in such a way that a decision on political direction taken by the European electorate could have a politically decisive effect.”
It has not supported a parliamentary government in the past and does not look like doing so in the coming parliamentary term (although read my call that it should do exactly that on Euobserver yesterday), but that does not mean that it cannot. If European political parties were to organise in a manner recognisable at national level, the model of democracy described by the constitutional court could come about. At that point, and it is perhaps not so far away, the nature of European democracy and the European Union would change very much.
It will be interesting to see if the German politicians who object to the court’s interpretation of the role of the European Parliament will do anything to change it. German MEPs are more numerous than those of any other country, and one of them is leader of the Socialists, so they could, if they wished, bring to the EP a lot of what the court has said it is missing.
Posted by Richard Laming at 15:51
1 comments
Who won the European elections?
I have being trying to find out how the votes were cast in the European elections earlier this month. There is a provisional list of how the seats have been allocated (it can only be provisional until the new MEPs formally reconvene on 14 July) – you can read it on the official elections website here – but there is nothing about how many votes were cast. The section on the website on each country gives the percentage share of the vote by party, and the overall percentage turnout, but not the actual number of votes cast.
The reason I ask is that I was hoping to be able to say in my article about the Socialists and Mr Barroso (read it here) that the Socialist share of the vote had fallen by X per cent. As it was, I had to limit myself to saying that there had been “a swing away from the Socialists towards the EPP”.
There are several possible reasons why the data is not presented in this way. The European parties are not yet formally established – the Irish seats won by Fianna Fail have been allocated to UEN, their old group, whereas they have indicated that next time they will be in ALDE – so it is a little premature to make a formal allocation of the votes. However, a vote calculation could still be done on the same basis and with the same proviso that applies to the seat calculation that is currently posted on the web.
Another reason might be that there are different electoral systems in use in different countries, which means that the votes themselves might have a slightly different meaning. There is some truth in this – countries like Ireland and Malta that use preferential voting give more opportunities to smaller parties to gain first preference votes than the list system used in Great Britain – but nevertheless an aggregate total would still carry a lot of meaning.
The biggest reason against publishing such a list might be that it implies that voters are in fact voting for European parties. Most political parties contested the European elections on a largely if not exclusively national basis – all politics is local, after all – and so there is no reason to put all the votes acquired by different national parties together.
The answer to this one is easy: when it comes to the exercise of power by MEPs in the European Parliament, the voters actually are voting for European parties, even if they do not realise it. MEPs organise and vote on political party, not national lines, and aggregating the votes cast for the different party groups would make this reality clearer and more visible to the voters. It has long been a complaint of federalists that European politics is treated as something that the average voter should not be concerned with, and here is proof of that attitude. The European Parliament should take a step away from that way of thinking, and publish the full numbers.
The reason I ask is that I was hoping to be able to say in my article about the Socialists and Mr Barroso (read it here) that the Socialist share of the vote had fallen by X per cent. As it was, I had to limit myself to saying that there had been “a swing away from the Socialists towards the EPP”.
There are several possible reasons why the data is not presented in this way. The European parties are not yet formally established – the Irish seats won by Fianna Fail have been allocated to UEN, their old group, whereas they have indicated that next time they will be in ALDE – so it is a little premature to make a formal allocation of the votes. However, a vote calculation could still be done on the same basis and with the same proviso that applies to the seat calculation that is currently posted on the web.
Another reason might be that there are different electoral systems in use in different countries, which means that the votes themselves might have a slightly different meaning. There is some truth in this – countries like Ireland and Malta that use preferential voting give more opportunities to smaller parties to gain first preference votes than the list system used in Great Britain – but nevertheless an aggregate total would still carry a lot of meaning.
The biggest reason against publishing such a list might be that it implies that voters are in fact voting for European parties. Most political parties contested the European elections on a largely if not exclusively national basis – all politics is local, after all – and so there is no reason to put all the votes acquired by different national parties together.
The answer to this one is easy: when it comes to the exercise of power by MEPs in the European Parliament, the voters actually are voting for European parties, even if they do not realise it. MEPs organise and vote on political party, not national lines, and aggregating the votes cast for the different party groups would make this reality clearer and more visible to the voters. It has long been a complaint of federalists that European politics is treated as something that the average voter should not be concerned with, and here is proof of that attitude. The European Parliament should take a step away from that way of thinking, and publish the full numbers.
¤ ¤ ¤
I remember working out aggregate numbers after the 1994 elections because they showed a mismatch between what was being reported and what really happened. In the overall total of MEPs, there was a swing from centre-right to centre-left, but this was actually skewed by the result in Great Britain. There, Labour gained 17 seats and the Conservatives lost 13, giving Labour 62 in total and the Conservatives only 18, but this was on the basis of a swing to Labour of only about 7 per cent. The huge gain in seats was the result of the first past the post electoral system that was used only in Great Britain (Northern Ireland uses proportional representation). The UK had 87 seats then, so Labour had 71 per cent of seats having won 44 per cent of the vote.
The consequence of this British peculiarity was that, as far as the allocation of seats was concerned, a swing in votes from left to right elsewhere in Europe was swamped by a swing from right to left in Britain. Those were the last European elections ruined by such an unfair electoral system in one member state, and the balance between seats and votes and thus public opinion is now much more closely matched.
The consequence of this British peculiarity was that, as far as the allocation of seats was concerned, a swing in votes from left to right elsewhere in Europe was swamped by a swing from right to left in Britain. Those were the last European elections ruined by such an unfair electoral system in one member state, and the balance between seats and votes and thus public opinion is now much more closely matched.
Posted by Richard Laming at 13:43
1 comments
